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Resuscitating Professionalism:
Self-Regulation in the Medical Marketplace
GailB. Agrawal*
"Conventionalwisdom says that traditionalprofessionalismis dead andgone."
The health care delivery system has shifted from a physician-dominated
professional model to a market paradigm in an effort to address the skyrocketing
costs of health care. Cost containment through controls on the use of health care
resources has become a mainstay of the new delivery system. Even an economic
model, however, must rely on physicians, as caregivers and as medical
managers, to make the decisions that require clinical knowledge and judgment.
Effective cost control, therefore, will require physician cooperation. The market
has attempted to secure physician participation by devising financial incentives
to limit health care services to patients, causing dire pronouncements of the
demise of medical professionalism. In the market model, physician selfregulation as a system of social control has been viewed as a dysfunctional
anachronism of a discarded paradigm, unworthy of serious attention. In this
Article, I contend that market failures and the inherent limitations of an
economic model to regulate health care delivery warrant a reexamination of
physician self-regulation as a means to address the necessity of and concerns
about health care spending controls.2 Although physicians, like all market
participants, will respond to economic incentives, the standards for professional
conduct adopted through self-regulatory mechanisms are an additional,
important, and overlooked determinant of physician conduct. They can be used
to achieve results that evade both market forces and command-and-control
legislation. These standards, however, have not kept up-to-date with the new
market demands on physicians. If physicians are to fulfill the tasks assigned to
them in a cost-constrained health care delivery system, professional standards
will have to be reexamined and modified to provide substantive guidance to
physicians making medical decisions under financial restraints.

* Professor, University of North Carolina Law School. The Author thanks
Professors Caroline Brown, Donald Hornstein, David Hyman, Peter Jacobson, Monica
Kalo, Philip Peters, and Melissa Saunders for helpful comments and encouragement. The
Author also thanks Joel Buenaventura and Kelly Furr for research assistance.

1. Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology
Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525, 1547-48 (1996).
2. I use the term "regulate" throughout this Article in a general sense to mean to
direct or intentionally influence conduct-market forces, ethical dictates, common law,
statutes, and regulations regulate physician conduct. Cf.Ted Schneyer, Legal Process
Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 33, 35-37 (1996)
(stating that the market for legal services, lawv firms, journalists, the American Bar
Association, and even liability insurers all may be said to regulate lawyers).
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I. INTRODUCTION
An inherent and unavoidable tension exists between public goals to control
health care spending and individuals' interests in meeting their needs and desires
for health care services.3 The health care delivery system must respond to both
public goals and individual needs, and therefore, it faces the inevitable, if
unenviable, task of balancing the competing and conflicting demands on health
care resources.
The managed care industry developed in direct response to public and
private calls for health care spending controls; it was the instrument of the socalled revolution in the health care delivery system from the professional to the
market paradigm.4 Managed care organizations made cost control their special
mission and relied on market mechanisms to advance that purpose. As the
managed care industry's market presence expanded, however, suspicions arose
that the methods it adopted to cure the problems of excessive health care
spending might well be worse than the disease.
The national debate soon shifted its focus from the high costs of health care
to the perceived excesses of the methods used by managed care organizations to
control health care spending.5 The usual methods of responding to these public
concerns so far have been unavailing. The recent onslaught of litigation against
managed care organizations, on theories ranging from racketeering to medical
malpractice and consumer fraud, provides persuasive evidence of public mistrust
of market solutions driven by competitive forces. 6 Congressional responses have

3. When I speak of health care spending in this Article, I refer generally to
spending by third-party payers-state and federal governments, insurers, managed care
organizations, and self-insured employers. In a market economy, individuals should be
free to spend as much of their discretionary income on health care, or any other consumer
good or service, as they wish.
4. Sociologists would characterize the current managed care system as a
bureaucratic model, rather than a market model. The ideal type bureaucratic model is one
that is hierarchically organized and controlled by organizations and their executives who
decide which products and services will be made, by whom, and how they will be offered
to consumers. In contrast, an ideal type market model is one in which consumer demand
and free competition determine what work will be done, by whom, and under what
conditions. See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, AND
POLICY 187-90 (1994) (discussing market, professional, and bureaucratic models to
organize health care delivery).
5. See, e.g., Examining Issues with Regard to the Delivery of Necessary Health
Care in the United States, Hearingof the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,and Pensions,
106th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 1999).
6. See, e.g., Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482-83 (3d Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs lack
standing to pursue a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
against a health maintenance organization ("HMO")); In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193
F.3d 151, 162-65 (3d Cir. 1999) (claims of vicarious liability for malpractice, negligent
adoption of hospital discharge policy, reckless indifference, and negligent selection of
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been equally unsatisfactory, addressing the lightning-rod issues of the day
without affecting comprehensive reform! The states have found their efforts
stymied by the preemptive effects of federal law.' Even federal courts have
confronted limits on the legal remedies available to redress harms alleged to
have resulted from the health care rationing that has become the trademark of the
managed care industry.9
The dispute over cost-control methods soon degenerated into an ideological
dichotomy between free market forces and command-and-control style
government regulation. The dichotomy engendered by the current debate,
however, is a false one.'0 It ignores a third option: reconsidering and
restructuring professional self-regulation to address physicians' behavior as
medical managers, as well as caregivers, in a newly cost-constrained
environment. This lack of attention to physician self-regulation was probably
not inadvertent. Professional self-regulation has been viewed as a remnant ofthe
largely discredited physician-dominated professional model for health care
delivery. The values reflected in self-regulatory standards have been blamed for
the escalation in health care spending. In addition, commentators have
pronounced professional self-regulation ineffective in policing its own ranks,
prone more to self-aggrandizement and self-interest than to public protection."

physicians not preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")); Maltz v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 704 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (App. Div.
2000) (claims of deceptive act or practice dismissed for failure to state a claim).
7. Congress enacted legislation prohibiting payers from requiring mothers and
newborns to be discharged from the hospital within twenty-four hours of a normal
vaginal birth and from requiring that mastectomies be done on an outpatient basis. See
Newborn & Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2935 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4 to -51 (1994)). Congress
failed to enact President Clinton's reform package and has to date failed to agree on a
patient bill of rights. See also GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE 32 (1998) (noting that
the problems with market-driven medicine cannot be resolved by legislation that
addresses single aspects ofmedical care or single reasons for hospitalization).
8. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (1994), preempts state laws and state common law causes of action that "relate to"
certain employee benefit plans. See discussion infra notes 259-69 and accompanying
text.
9. ERISA provides limited remedies for violations of the statute. See 29 U.S.C. §
1132 (1994).

10. See Troyen A. Brennan, An EthicalPerspective on Health Care Inmirance
Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 37,37-38 (1993) (noting the "emphasis on economics and
politics" and arguing for inclusion of "social and moral" terms and values); William M.
Sage, Physiciansas Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1529, 1552-59 (1999).
11. Professor Stanley Gross in his seminal work on professional licensure opined
that "[p]rofessional licensure as the solution ... has become worse than the problem,"
arguing that self-regulation "serves to protect and enhance income, security, status, and
privilege" of physicians. STANLEY J. GROSS, OF FOXES AND HEN HousEs 5 (1984).
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Its rejection, therefore, might be characterized as an implicit, and resounding,
vote of no confidence in the utility of professional self-regulation in a marketbased system.
In this Article, I take issue with those who condemn professional selfregulation. Professionalism and self-regulation developed in response to
deviations from market conditions that are inherent in medicine and that persist
in the managed care system that has evolved under the market paradigm. I
contend that professional standards retain viability as a means to address
intractable problems in the market for medical services. Drawing on insights
from law-and-norm theory, I argue that self-regulatory standards are a powerful
determinant of physician conduct. The failures of physician self-regulation,
therefore, argue not for dispensing with self-regulation as an institution of social
control, but rather for strategic intervention to improve its functioning. Using
precepts developed in comparative institutional analysis, I maintain that a selfregulatory system is well suited to oversee the kinds of decisions that are
involved in efforts to control health care spending by limiting the use of health
care services. The paradox, which this Article begins to consider, is how
professional norms and self-regulation can address the problems created under
the auspices of the professional paradigm, as well as the real and potential
market abuses mediated by professionals under the market paradigm. 2 In short,
the question is whether medicine can heal not only itself but also the institutions
that responded to the problems created under its watch.
The central premise of this Article is that the market, law, and professional
self-regulation all must be brought to bear on society's endeavor to control
health care spending. Where one fails, the other two must compensate. Because
professional self-regulation is the neglected member of the troika, my aim with
this Article is to initiate a dialogue about its potential role in the current market
paradigm and to suggest how it might be made more responsive to social needs.
Although self-regulatory responses could focus on managed care
organizations, 13 physicians warrant an independent focus. They are the constant
in health care; regardless of the system of delivery or the method of financing
health care services," in a medico-technological environment, physicians will

12. See Timothy S.Jost, Introduction to Regulation ofthe HealthcareProfessions,
in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 10 (T. S. Jost ed., 1997) (raising the

issue of whether the rise of markets in medicine creates new roles for licensure
authorities).
13. Margaret O'Kane, the executive director of the National Committee on Quality
Assurance, has argued that private accreditation serves as a self-regulatory mechanism
for the managed care industry. See Margaret O'Kane, NCQA: Using Market Pressure
to Promote Quality in Managed Care, in THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING MANAGED
CARE (John Billi & Gail Agrawal eds., forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with
author). This Article's focus on physician self-regulation is not intended as a rejection
of the application of self-regulatory mechanisms to managed care organizations.
14. Some commentators predict the imminent demise of the managed care system
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make most of the health care decisions that determine how much, and on whom,
health care dollars will be spent. In the present-day managed care system,
physicians implement cost-containment initiatives and take on the role of
medical manager and payer, as well as that of caregiver, to the extent that their
behavior is affected by factors in addition to economic incentives, those factors
deserve an independent review. 5
The economic model has underestimated the importance of professional
norms and their influence on physician conduct. Current market incentives
encourage conduct that existing self-regulatory standards seemingly forbid. The
failure to acknowledge physicians' actual roles in allocating health care
resources and the conflicts they present has stymied the development of
meaningful standards to guide physicians in fulfilling these responsibilities.
Moreover, the public disavowal that managed care delivery systems necessarily
entail physician allocation of health care resources prevents participatory
dialogue about societal expectations for physician conduct in a market-based
system. These are conditions precedent to the evolution of professional norms
that respond to societal needs, just as the evolution of professional norms is a
necessary condition to achieving meaningful health care cost control.
This Article has six parts. Part II is a primer on health care cost
containment. In it, I address the systemic factors that led to the escalation in
health care spending and the methods used by managed care organizations, with
the direct involvement of physicians, to control that spending. This Part
highlights the changing role of the physician in the evolving medical
marketplace and explores the response of the self-regulatory system to market
initiatives. Part III identifies the risks of controlling health care spending by
limiting the use of health care services to permit an analysis of how well the
market model has responded to those risks and to identify opportunities for
response through self-regulatory mechanisms. Part IV turns to the examination,
and rejection, of the contention that market forces alone will address the risks of
controlling spending by limiting use. Part V discusses self-regulation and
considers the promise, as well as the perils, of professional self-regulation in

as it currently exists. See, e.g., Vicki Yates Brown & Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed
Care at the Crossroads: Can Managed Care OrganizationsSurvive Government
Regulation?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 58 (1998) (predicting the "demise of managed
care as we presently know it").

15. In a body of scholarly work, Professor Mark Hall established that among the
possible decision-makers for health care rationing decisions, physicians were preferable.
See MARKA. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 113-69(1997). In an earlier
work reviewing that book, I agreed with Professor Hall's central premise. I also
expressed some disappointment that he did not discuss how physicians were to evolve
from the traditional role of caregiver, focused on medical benefit largely to the exclusion
of cost, to the dual role that he envisioned. See Gail B. Agrawal, Chicago Hope Meets
the Chicago School, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1793, 1795 (1998). In this Article, I suggest that
professional self-regulation must be a key component if that evolution is to occur.
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health care. Part VI offers some preliminary thoughts on the means to influence
the development of professional norms to respond to the need for health care
spending controls.
II. WHAT GOES UP DOESN'T ALWAYS COME DowN
A. The Story of Health CareSpending
For much of this century, the health care delivery system in the United
States was based on a professional model, with its focus on highly skilled
professionals making technical, scientific decisions on their patients' behalf.'
Physicians made these decisions largely unfettered by market forces and guided
only by their own ethical dictates. Isolated medical errors were addressed
through the tort system, and incompetent physicians were handled quietly within
their own ranks. The last twenty years have seen a reformation as health care
delivery evolved into a market model, with consumers selecting medical services
as one of a market basket of consumer goods. 7 The causes for the reformation
of the health care delivery system are complex and varied, including public
distrust of both the professional elite and big government, and the increasing
spheres of influence of large corporate purchasers. But the principal culprit was
seemingly uncontrollable increases in medical spending.
Many factors contributed to the high levels of spending on health care in
twentieth century America. Dramatic increases in scientific knowledge and
concomitant improvement in the effectiveness of medical interventions have
characterized the second half of this century-a process that promises to
continue. With enhanced results came increasing use, and with heightened
utilization came increasing costs. The 1940s saw the rise of private health
insurance. 8 In 1965, the federal government created the Medicare program to
provide public insurance to individuals from the age of sixty-five and to those
with certain disabilities, and joined with the states under the auspices of the
Medicaid program to extend health care coverage to those considered
categorically or medically needy.'9 The existence of third-party payers made
health care affordable to more Americans, thereby increasing the use of and
spending on health care services.

16. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 17-

19 (1982).
17. See James Blumstein, Health CareReform and Competing Visions of Medical
Care: Antitrust andState ProviderCooperationLegislation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1459,
1463-67 (1994) (discussing the professional paradigm and the market paradigm).
18. For a discussion of the effect of the rise of third-party payers on the health care
system, see MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS 13-15 (1993).

19. For a discussion of the effect of Medicare and Medicaid legislation on the
medical profession, see Eliot Freidson, The Medical Profession in Transition, in
MEDICAL WORK INAMERICA: ESSAYS ON HEALTH CARE (Eliot Freidson ed. 1989).
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The 1970s saw a dramatic rise in complex medical technology, which
continues through the present date. 20 This new technology frequently
supplemented, rather than supplanted, the prior technology, with the predictable
outcome: more available services lead to more spending. The last twenty years
have seen the effects of an aging population and a dramatic increase in the
efficacy, and the cost, of pharmaceuticals, 2 both of which promise to continue.
Between 1980 and 1993, health care spending increased from 8.9% of gross
domestic product to 13.5% of gross domestic product." Despite the high levels
of health care spending in the United States, major health indices revealed little
difference from other industrialized nations with significantly lower levels of
spending on medical services.'
As medical spending increased, the cost of health care coverage increased,
as well. Higher premiums led inevitably to higher numbers of uninsured
individuals, as small employers elected not to offer coverage to their employees
and increasing numbers of individuals were unable to afford to purchase health
care coverage on their own.24 Even large employers were affected. Excessive
spending on health care coverage adversely affected their global
competitiveness, as American employers outspent their international
competitors, raising the overall cost of their products. High levels of
government spending on health care affected the amounts ofmoney available for
other important goods and services, including those like safe highways and
adequately funded public schools that contribute significantly to the overall
health and welfare of the population.
The blame for the increasing levels of health care spending was placed on
the combined effects of the physician-dominated professional model for health
care delivery, fee-for-service reimbursement for medical services, and indemnity
insurance, although an analysis reveals that other powerful forces were at least
equally culpable. Traditional medical ethics, dominated by the twin principles
20. See Dennis Cauchon, Americans Pay More: Here's Why, USA TODAY, Nov.

10, 1999, at IA.
21. See Deidre Shesgreen, Congress Hearsan Outcry over Drug Costs, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH,

Nov. 7, 1999, at A14.

22. New EBRlResearch: NationalHealth Care CostsExpected to Keep Going Up,
PRNEWSWIRE, Aug. 4,2000, availableat LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire file. The
rate stayed steady between 1993 and 1998, but is expected to rise to 13.9% when
expenditures for 1999 are calculated. Id.
23. Many factors in addition to health care services affect health care outcomes,
including lifestyle factors like diet and exercise, and also genetic makeup. Research on
citizens' satisfaction with the health care system in ten developed nations shows that only
ten percent of Americans thought that only "minor changes" were needed in their health
care system, compared with fifty-six percent of Canadians, forty-one percent of Germans,
and twenty-six percent of British citizens. See R. J. Blendon et al., Satisfaction with
Health Systems in Ten Nations, 9 HEALTH AFFAIRS 185, 185-92 (1990).
24. See The Uninsured in America: A ChartBook (2d ed. 2000), available at
www.kff.orglcontentlarchieve/1407/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2000).
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of beneficence and non-malfeasance,' were interpreted to require that physicians
"put the patient first" and subordinate all other concerns, whether personal to the
physician or external to the patient-physician relationship.26 Fee-for-service
reimbursement coupled with indemnity insurance reinforced this ethical
principle by giving physicians financial incentives to provide as much beneficial
care as possible.27 Insured patients' inattention to the costs of that care eased any
ethical pangs that their physicians might have had about high charges for these
services.28 Although some physicians undoubtedly responded to those incentives
and provided wasteful and even harmful care, even ethical physicians lacked any
financial incentive or professional directive to evaluate the cost effectiveness of
their medical spending decisions.2 9 With the evolution of the bioethics
movement, the sole limitation on the physician's largess was the patient's right
to refuse to give consent to the physician's recommendations.3"
Insured patients suffered from the same infirmity as physicians: the lack of
any personal or financial incentive to control health care spending. Third-party
payers sheltered insured individuals from the economic effects of health care
treatment decisions. Most patients lacked the ability to dictate health care
spending limits, even if they were inclined to do so; patients who were not
clinically trained were uninformed about which, or how much, medical services
would be appropriate. Accordingly, patients relied on their physicians'
judgments about medical services. This reliance allowed physicians to influence
both the supply and the demand sides of the health care marketplace. Market
forces had little effect in a health care delivery system based on a professional
model where physician-as-seller and patient-as-purchaser did not confront the
economic effects of their behavior.

25. In familiar terms, these principles are captured by the charge "first, do no
harm."
26. Professor Mark Hall calls this patient-primacy ethic the "absolute quality"

ethic. HALL, supranote 15, at 114-15.
27. Paradoxically, health insurance, itself, was made feasible by physicians' ethical
commitments to provide only beneficial care. Without the limits imposed by that
fundamental ethic, there would have been no reasoned way to protect insurers from
paying for useless or harmful medical services that might be demanded by patients or
provided by unscrupulous physicians. See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1540 (discussing
physicians' ethics and health insurance).
28. High charges to insured patients were used to supplement charity care to
indigent patients.
29. If physicians were perfect agents for their patients, they would have no
incentive to control health care spending, even if they had no personal financial incentive
to increase spending.

30. Bioethics shifted the focus of physician ethics from beneficence, which was
criticized for its paternalistic roots, to patient autonomy. See THOMAs A.MAPPES &JANE
S. ZEMBATY, BIOMEDICAL ETHics 44-45 (1981).
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The legal system was not silent in the face of increasing health care costs,
although its response was of limited utility.3 Congress enacted prohibitions on
payments for referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients and on physician
referrals to entities with which physicians have financial relationships to
counteract the financial incentives for over-utilization of health care services,
which were inherent in the fee-for-service system 3 2 Many states passed similar
statutes with broader applicability.3 3 Eventually, the ethical guidelines
promulgated by the American Medical Association ("AMA") and other
professional associations came to mirror these legal restrictions on physician
financial conduct3 4
In 1983, Congress modified the reimbursement system for hospitals that
provided treatment to Medicare patients?' The prospective-payment system
provided a fixed payment for hospital services provided to Medicare
beneficiaries based on the patient's diagnosis-related group' In theory, this
change should have increased the incentive for hospitals to control health care
spending decisions by physicians, because the hospital would receive the same
payment regardless of the type and amount of services ordered by the physician.
But Congress' response sent a mixed message. While seemingly giving
hospitals incentives to control costs, Congress inhibited the hospitals' ability to

31. Some evidence suggests that the legal system will fall into step with the
prevailing paradigm. In an influential article published in 1988, Professor Mark Hall
maintained that the legal system supported the professional paradigm to the detriment of
cost-control efforts. See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:
Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 474-502
(1988). Slightly more than a decade later, Professor Peter Jacobson showed that the legal
system had shifted to support the market paradigm. See Peter D. Jacobson, Legal
Challenges to Managed Care Cost Containment Programs: An Initial Assessment,
HEALTH AFFAMS, July-Aug. 1999, at 80-8 1.
32. See The Patient and Program Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994
& Supp. 1998) (commonly referred to as the anti-kickback provision); Ethics in Patient
Referral Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994) (commonly referred to as "Stark" after the
congressman who introduced it).
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.654 (West 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
1745 (West 2000).
34. See discussion infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. This shift in
professional standards following a change in legal requirements provides empirical
evidence of the effect of law on social norms.

35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1994).
36. Hospitals historically reinforced the professional paradigm of health care
delivery through their reliance on organized medical staffs to oversee the quality of care
provided in the hospital as well as to determine, through its influence on admissions to
the medical staff, by whom that care would be provided. Because hospitals relied on
physicians and their admissions of patients for revenues, hospitals also lacked any
incentive to control health care spending by imposing limits on the use of health care
services.
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effect physician behavior by including a prohibition on hospital actions intended
37
to influence physicians to reduce health care services to Medicare beneficiaries.
Organized medicine followed this lead as well, acknowledging in its ethical
standards that cost was a concern while rejecting physician rationing and failing
to adopt standards to assist physicians with their inevitable role in controlling
health care spending." Physician-dominated state boards of medicine, charged
with physician licensure and discipline, also turned a blind eye to physician costcontainment efforts, beyond the prohibition of fraud and restraints of market
practices that were perceived as weakening physicians' market power. 9 The
response by Congress and organized medicine signaled a conflict that permeates
the current spending crisis: a desire to control spending on health care services
coupled with a refusal to acknowledge the inevitability of limiting the use of
health care services. The unwillingness to confront this conflict has slowed
legislative and professional responses to current market incentives to underutilize medical services.
With physicians, patients, and hospitals disinclined or disabled to act as
cost-control agents and legal authorities out-of-step with market-based costcontainment activities, only payers were left to effect health care spending
controls.40 Employers, the source of health care coverage for the majority of
Americans under the age of sixty-five, began to cast about for ways to control
their health care coverage costs. Encouraged by national and state legislative
developments encouraging the formation of alternative delivery models, the
market responded accordingly.4 Increasingly, employers chose health care
benefit plan designs that included mechanisms to control spending on health care
services. These control mechanisms placed spending authority in the hands of
those who paid for health care services, generally commercial insurers, managed
care organizations, and self-insured employers. It remained for private payers
to bring physician conduct into alignment with public desires to control health
care spending. The marketplace quickly embraced that which Congress and
organized medicine had forbidden, creating economic incentives for physicians
to limit the use of health care services in the commercial marketplace, leaving
physicians to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable on their individual terms.42

37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
38. See discussion infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
39. See CARL F. AMERINGER, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF
PUBLIC PROTECTION 131-33 (1999).

40. Payers for health care services are commercial insurers, self-insured employers,
managed care organizations, and the state and federal government.
41. See Gail B. Agrawal, Managing the Managers, in THE CHALLENGE OF
REGULATING MANAGED CAE (John Billi & Gail Agrawal eds., forthcoming 2001)

(manuscript on file with author) (discussing the role of legislation in encouraging the
development of the managed care industry).
42. See discussion infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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B. The ManagedCare Solution
"Managed care" is simply a shorthand term for a range of diverse health
care benefit designs that combine health care services with payment for those
services, giving the payer substantial control over both the provision of services
and the amount that will be paid for the services provided. This Article defines
as managed care organizations any legal entity that sells or administers these
benefit designs. 43 Managed care organizations have a wide variety of means to
effect health care spending." Because of the implications for physician
regulation, this Article will address only on those cost-control methods that
depend on the medical expertise of physicians.4
1. Physician-Managers
Managed care organizations frequently base decisions about whether to pay
for recommended treatment on whether the treatment is required to treat the
patient's symptoms or to make a diagnosis of the patient's ailment. Physicians
43. Entities that sell managed care benefit designs include commercial insurers,
HMOs, and physician-sponsored organizations. These entities and other third party
administrators also manage the managed care benefit designs used by self-insured
employers to provide coverage to their employees. In the former case, the managed care
organization bears the ultimate insurance risk and is the payer;, in the latter, the selfinsured employer retains the risk and is the payer.
44. For example, like indemnity insurers, managed care organizations specify the
types of services that will be eligible for reimbursement. They impose conditions under
which covered services will be reimbursed, for example, requiring a patient to make copayments to receive services, to obtain a referral to receive treatment from a specialist,
and to receive services from designated caregivers. They control the cost of services, and
less directly the utilization of services, by contracting with caregivers who agree to
accept the contract price in exchange for their services, by monitoring their financial
performance, and by influencing through reimbursement mechanisms and coverage
decisions the care that they provide.
45. An example of a cost-control method that does not require any physician
involvement includes designing benefits to exclude certain high-cost medical or surgical
procedures. Some payers, for example, exclude from coverage high dose chemotherapy
with autologous bone marrow transplant or specified solid organ transplants. See, eg.,
Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1409-10 (7th Cir. 1994) (excluding
high dose chemotherapy vith autologous bone marrow transplant from coverage).
46. This process is not unprecedented. The managed care industry adopted and
refined methods that were used by other types of third-party payers to control spending
on health care services. Blue Cross plans and indemnity insurers frequently relied on
conmittees of physicians to review and evaluate retrospectively the necessity of hospital
admissions and lengths of stay to determine whether they would provide reimbursement
for services rendered to insureds. In 1972, Congress created Professional Standards
Review Organizations to perform a similar function for government-sponsored health
care programs. A decade later, Congress replaced those organizations with private
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employed by or under contract with the managed care organization are
responsible for making these decisions, which serve as coverage determinations
based on medical judgments about reasonable medical treatment.47 Coverage
decisions may be made before any services are rendered (prospective review)48
or during an ongoing course of treatment (concurrent review).49 For example,
a managed care organization's contract may provide payment for medical
services related to problems of the spine, but payment will be made for surgery
on the spine only if that surgery is deemed "medically necessary" for an
individual patient."
Although the term "medical necessity" may convey little more than
"doctor's orders" to a layperson, in this context "medical necessity" is a defined
term in the contract between the managed care organization and its customer,
typically an employer. Because the definition is determined by agreement
between private parties, the term in its application lacks uniformity. Some

entities that were engaged to perform utilization review and authorized both to deny
claims for payment and to impose sanctions on caregivers who provided unnecessary or
inappropriate care or care of inadequate quality to government beneficiaries. For a full
discussion, see Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountabilityfor UtilizationReview in ERtSA

Health Plans,77 N.C. L. REV. 731,745-53 (1999).
47. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228-31 (2000) (classifying coverage
decisions that are based on physicians' judgments as "mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions" or simply "mixed eligibility decisions").
48. The prospective utilization review process is based on a telephone, paper, or
an electronic system; it does not include face-to-face contact with the patient or the
treating physician. The typical pre-certification process involves an initial review of a
physician's treatment or testing request by a registered nurse who gathers medical
information about the patient and compares it with clinical criteria adopted by the
managed care organization. The nurse-reviewer will consider the timing of the service:
whether less costly methods have been exhausted when a highly technological procedure
is recommended, for example. The nurse-reviewer also will consider the site of services:
will the service be provided in the least intensive, and therefore least costly, location?
If an inpatient hospital stay is requested, the reviewer will consider the length of that
stay. If the reviewer determines that the criteria that have been adopted by the managed
care organization are satisfied, the recommended service is pre-authorized for payment.
If the criteria are not satisfied, the nurse-reviewer refers the request to a physician for a
decision whether to approve or deny pre-authorization for payment.
49. The concurrent review process is similar to that for prospective review. It
occurs after a patient is admitted to a hospital or has otherwise begun an extensive
treatment regime. Medical personnel review the treating physician's planned course of
treatment, including the intended length of inpatient stay and the use of ancillary
services. If the initial reviewer cannot approve the treatment plan, a physician is called
in to review the course of treatment to make the final decision about payment for the
recommended course of treatment.
50. This example is not hypothetical. See Long v. Great W. Life & Annuity Ins.
Co., 957 P.2d 823 (Wyo. 1998); see also discussion infra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
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common elements to the contractual definition might be counter-intuitive to the
average patient. Medically necessary services may be defined as those that are
"essential,"' not merely useful or appropriate, and that are "consistent with
accepted standards of medical practice,"' "as determined by the [payer]," rather
than by the treating physician.' While the information about the process of
determining medical necessity provided to individual enrollees highlights the
managed care organization's desire to avoid "outdated" or "unnecessary"
treatments, the process is intended not only to eliminate the provision of
medical services that are not likely to provide medical benefits to a patient, but
also to introduce an element of cost effectiveness into coverage policy.5 s The
failure to acknowledge and explain the dual purpose contributes to public
suspicion about utilization management practices.
The adoption of utilization review practices introduced a new category of
physicians: those who review the medical recommendations of their practicing
peers to determine whether the managed care organization will pay for the
proposed treatment. These physician-managers have maintained that they are
exempt from the dictates of medical ethics and the oversight of state boards of
medicine, because their decisions concern cost not medicine.' Organized
51. See, e-g., Dowden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 126 F.3d 641 (5th
Cir. 1997); Friends Hosp. v. MetraHealth Serv. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
52. McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998); see,
e.g., Gates v. King, 129 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
53. FriendsHosp., 9 F. Supp. 2d at 530; see, e.g., McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1256.

54. See, e.g., Long, 957 P.2d at 830 (referring to physicians and nurses who vill
review a treatment plan to protect insureds from "outdated" and "unnecessary"
treatment).
55. The extent to which medical necessity determinations result in cost
containment is open to debate. One study found that some medical necessity definitions
incorporate cost-effectiveness analysis, but that respondents were divided about its
efficacy, with administrators favoring its use and clinicians viewing it as an intrusion into
clinical autonomy. See Peter D. Jacobson et al., Defining and Implementing Medical
Necessity in WashingtonState and Oregon, INQUIRY, Summer 1997, at 147. A recent
California study found that only a few medical necessity contractual definitions included
cost-effectiveness, but that private managed care plans and medical directors nonetheless
mentioned cost-effectiveness as a prominent criterion for decision-making. See Sara J.
Singer & Linda A. Bergthold, Prospectsfor Improved Decision MakingAbout Medical
Necessity, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 202. This study suggests a gap between
what plans actually do and what they state publicly. Id.; see Maio v. Aetna Inc., No. 991969, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15056, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999), aff'd, 221 F.3d 472
(3d Cir. 2000) (defendant Aetna classified its public statements about quality of care
offered through its managed care plans as "mere puffery").
56. See David S. Shimm & Roy G. Spece, Jr., Discovering the Ethical
RequirementsofPhysicians'Roles in the Service of ConflictingInterests as Healersand
as Citizens, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST INCLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 61 & n.62
(Roy G. Spece et al. eds., 1996) (quoting an HMO medical director stating that his duty
was solely to the payer); Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs of Ariz., 949 P.2d 530, 533
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medicine has disagreed, while the law has been equivocal on the role of the
physician-manager.
In its first pronouncement on the subject, issued in 1992, the AMA opined
that physicians in administrative positions were subject to the requirement of the
Hippocratic Oath to "put the needs of patients first." 7 Seven years later, the
AMA addressed the specific ethical obligations of physician-managers." Again,
the AMA maintained that the patient-primacy directive governed physicianmanagers who were not engaged in direct patient-physician relationships when
their activities involved the use of professional knowledge or values gained
through medical education, training, or practice and their decisions affected
individual or group patient care.59 Medical necessity determinations fulfilled
both criteria.('
The law seemed less certain than organized medicine about its role in
overseeing these new market actors. In 1997, the Arizona Court of Appeals
became the first court to hold that physician-managers were subject to the
jurisdiction of the state board of medicine and to disciplinary action on the basis
of their clinically based coverage decisions." Three years later, thirteen states
had enacted legislation requiring state licensure of all medical directors, while
legislatures in eight states had rejected similar bills.62 In the absence of specific
legislation, some state attorneys general ruled that the state board of medicine
did not have jurisdiction over physician-managers' medical necessity decisions.'
Whether physician-managers will be subject to the same professional and legal
constraints as practicing physicians remains an open question."

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); discussion infra notes 271-87 and accompanying text.
57. AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Ethical Guidelines for Physicians in
Management Positions and Other Non-Clinical Roles, Op. 8.02 (1998), in MEDICAL
ETHICS: CODES, OPINIONS AND STATEMENTS 35 (Baruch A. Brody et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter MEDICAL ETHICS]. The statement was updated and reissued in June 1998.
58. AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Ethical Obligations of Medical Directors, Op.
8.021, availableat www.ama-assn.org (last visited Aug. 5, 2000).
59. Id.; see also, E. Haavi Morreim, PlayingDoctor: CorporateMedical Practice
and Medical Malpractice,32 MICH. J.L. REF. 939, 953-56 (1999) (discussing whether
HMOs practice medicine).
60. In addition to compliance with the patient-primacy ethic, physician-managers
were directed to apply coverage rules equally to all patients and to use fair and just
criteria in making any determinations related to medical care. See discussion supranotes
46-55 and accompanying text.
61. See Murphy, 949 P.2d at 530; discussion infranotes 271-76 and accompanying
text.
62. See Linda 0. Prager, Texas BoardAttempts to DisciplineMedical Director,
AM. MED. NEWS, May 8, 2000 (listing states and discussing opinion of the Ohio attorney
general that the state board of medicine does not have jurisdiction over physicianmanagers).
63. See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-130 (Kan. 1990).
64. See discussion infra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
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The adoption of utilization management techniques also had an effect on
physicians who remained in traditional treatment roles. It eliminated the ability
of practicing physicians to prescribe without regard to cost." Practicing
physicians saw the process as an impingement on their professional autonomy
and a potential occasion for ethical missteps.' In contrast to its uncertainty
about physician-managers, however, the law clearly supported utilization
controls and was largely unsympathetic to physicians' objections.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Federal Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1974 mandated that federally qualified HMOs have
"effective procedures to monitor utilization and control cost," thereby
envisioning economic constraints on clinical conduct' 6 State statutes mirrored
this authorization.' Thus, public policy evolved to reflect economic reality: if
health care spending was to be controlled, physicians could not continue to be
shielded from the economic consequences of their clinical decisions. When
physicians challenged the expanded role of payers in the clinical relationship,
courts declined to deviate from that legislative directive. In one oft-cited case,
Varolv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,69 a district court judge rejected
a challenge brought by a group of psychiatrists to a utilization review program
65. Circumstances in which a patient has the financial resources and willingness
to remit payment from personal funds are an exception.
66. The closest ethical dictates come to offering direction to physicians who are
subject to financial risk for their patients' care is to urge them to engage in self-help in
assessing reimbursement arrangements to avoid the occasion of improper influence and
to reject financial arrangements that could lead to withholding medically necessary care.
See, e.g., AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Conflicts of Interest Under Capitation, Op.
8.051 (1998), in MEDICAL ETHICS, supranote 57, at 37-38 (urging evaluation of financial
adequacy of the proposed arrangement and stop-loss insurance to protect against
catastrophic expenses); AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Managed Care, Op. 8.13 (1996),
in MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 41 (permitting financial incentives that promote
the cost-effective delivery of care but not the vthholding of medically necessary care);
Am. Acad. of Neurology Code of Prof'l Conduct 5.2 (1993), reprintedin MEDICAL
ETHICS, supranote 57, at 376 ("neurologist must avoid... financial arrangements that
would, solely because of personal gain, influence decisions in the care of patients"); Am.
Acad. of Ophthalmology, Advisory Opinion ofthe Code ofEthics: EthicalObligations
in a ManagedCareEnvironment (1997), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57,

at 546 (capitated physician groups must provide patients with the care they need even at
a financial loss); Am. Urological Ass'n, Policy Principleson Health CareReform (1997),
reprinted in MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 1011-12 (opposing reimbursement

systems that put the primary care referring physician at financial risk for referral to
specialty care).
67. 42 C.F.R. § 401.103(b) (1998).
68. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners first promulgated model
legislation for HMOs in 1972. For the revised Model -MO Act, see Health Maintenance
Organization Model Act, Draft No. 430 (Mar. 28, 2001), available at
http.//www.naic.org (last visited May 5, 2001).
69. 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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adopted by General Motors."0 The program gave personnel employed by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield the authority to withhold payment approval for mental
health treatment. The psychiatrists maintained that that authority gave the payer
the right to determine methods of diagnosis and treatment and resulted in the
unauthorized practice of medicine.7 The court rejected the argument, noting that
the psychiatrists' ethical obligations required them to provide appropriate care
and treatment without regard to the advance payment decision.72 Varol
foreshadowed the dilemma between traditional medical ethical standards and
methods adopted in the health care marketplace as society has attempted to effect
health care spending controls. The law was prepared to rely on physicians'
ethics to protect against market excesses, while those who promulgated ethical
standards were equally prepared to overlook the changes that market innovations
wreaked on medical practice.
2. Physician Incentives
Physicians influence or control approximately seventy-five percent of
health care spending through their practice patterns. 7' A careful review by
physician-managers of each of the myriad clinical decisions that physicians
make each day is not feasible.74 Meaningful cost control, therefore, would
remain elusive as long as practicing physicians were permitted to insulate
themselves from economic considerations. Accordingly, managed care
organizations began to devise methods to enhance practicing physicians'
awareness of the financial consequences of their treatment practices. Rather than
directly confronting the conflict between market practices to control spending
and ethical dictates to make cost a secondary (or tertiary) concern for physicians,
many managed care organizations adopted business practices designed to shift
responsibility for controlling utilization to practicing physicians. This change
in the locus of decision-making resulted in practicing physicians taking on an
unacknowledged role in allocating, or rationing, health care services, a role for
which neither the market nor medical ethics prepared them.7"

70. Id. at 831-34.
71. Id. at 832-33.
72. Id. at 833 (characterizing as "strange stuff indeed from which to fashion a legal
argument" an assertion that the psychiatrists would be affected in their treatment
decisions by the payer's payment decision).
73. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Lee Goldman, ProtectingPatient Welfare in
Managed Care: Six Safeguards, 23 J.HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 635, 635 (1998).
74. United Healthcare decided to abandon utilization review mechanisms due to
their cost and the relatively small number of recommended treatments that were found
to be inappropriate. See Penelope Lemov, The HMO LaidLow, GOVERNING MAG., June
2000, availableat http://www.lexis.com (noting that United HealthCare has limited its
use of utilization management finding that it was not cost effective).
75. See discussion infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
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Managed care organizations adopted a variety of different kinds of direct
and indirect incentives to facilitate this shift They attempted to identify and
contract with those physicians whose practice styles were already cost conscious,
monitoring the caregivers' practice patterns over time to identify those
practitioners whose costs of care exceeded the managed care organizations'
expectations. High-cost caregivers could be counseled in ways to improve their
financial or clinical performance, or their contracts could be terminated or not
renewed after the initial term. These selective contracting and monitoring
measures, however, were inexact, because managed care organizations often
lacked sophisticated methods and the data necessary to account for differences
in severity of disease across caregivers. A reviewer could not tell if a
physician's average cost-of-care per case was high because she ordered more
care than was necessary, or because her patients were sicker and required more
care than the patients of other physicians. Despite the method's imperfections,
the fear of "deselection" served as a powerful self-policing mechanism to
physicians
seeking to avoid that consequence by controlling their practice
76
patterns.
Managed care organizations also attempted to shift the locus of utilization
control from payer to caregiver by structuring payment arrangements in a
manner that required physicians to make cost-conscious clinical
recommendations or risk adverse personal financial consequences. These
methods ranged from withholding certain amounts from the contract payment
rate to creating bonus pools and conditioning additional payment on achieving
utilization targets for referrals, hospitalization, or prescriptions. Managed care
organizations also abandoned fee-for-service reimbursement, 4th its inherent
incentives to "do more," in favor of a capitated method of reimbursement, which
provided a fixed per member-per month payment. Under the least complex
capitation payment arrangement, a managed care organization would pay a
primary care physician a fixed sum regardless of the amount or type of care that
the physician provided to the patient. Medical services that were not provided
by the capitated physician were reimbursed by the managed care organization
under separate arrangements. The capitated physician was at financial risk only
for her own services.
Over time, managed care organizations diversified capitation methods.
More complex capitation payment arrangements included services that were not
provided personally by the capitated physician such as referrals to other
physicians and the services ordered by them. Under these arrangements, a
capitated physician would be required to pay other caregivers for services
required by the patients that were subject to the capitation arrangement. A

76. See Bryan A. Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blowfor
MaintainingPatient-PhysicianRelationshipsin the Era of Managed Care?,72 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV. 799, 802 n.13 (1997) (discussing physicians' views that they must comply
with managed care guidelines and contain costs to avoid deselection).
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primary care physician who referred a patient to a cardiologist, for example,
would have to make arrangements to pay the cardiologist from the capitation
payment. It was a short step from including under the capitation umbrella all
services that the capitated physician provided or controlled to all medical
services that the patient required. Physicians were soon bearing substantial
amounts of financial risks associated with their patients' medical needs."
Having contracted physicians assume responsibility for utilization of health
care services offered a number of benefits to managed care organizations. It
helped with the public relations problems that invariably occurred when payers
said "no" to requests to treat terminally ill patients, children, or other especially
sympathetic individuals. Shifting responsibility to physicians might have also
allowed managed care organizations to avoid legal liability for harm to
individual patients that might result from rationing health care services.78
The return of control over utilization to physicians had positive effects for
them as well, permitting the recapture of their professional autonomy in a
market-based system. The physician regained the ability to make medical
decisions unfettered by managed care physician-managers. 79 Professional
autonomy, however, came at a price. If the cost of the services required by the
designated group of enrollees exceeded the contract amount paid by the managed
care organization, the costs were required to be borne by the capitated physician
or physician organization out of funds otherwise available to it. °
Although market incentives could affect day-to-day clinical decisionmaking more effectively than limited review by physician-managers, market

77. For a complete discussion of capitated methods of reimbursement, see David
Orentlicher, PayingPhysiciansMore To Do Less: FinancialIncentives to Limit Care,
30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155 (1996).

78. Managed care organizations avoid liability under respondeat superior because
physicians are usually independent contractors, rather than employees. While they may
be held liable on other agency theories, they can take steps to deny an apparent agency
relationship. Until the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1996), managed care
organizations successfully had defended against claims of vicarious liability on grounds
of ERISA preemption. Id. at 351-52. But see Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kan.
City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994) (holding
that ERISA preempted claims of vicarious liability against managed care organizations).
79. Because the physician organization bore the financial risk of care, the managed
care organization typically would delegate to the capitated entity a wide-range of
administrative duties. These duties included the rights to select and credential the
caregivers to provide services to managed care enrollees and to decide which covered
services would be reimbursed.
80.

Physicians could avoid large out-of-pocket losses by the purchase of

reinsurance. If a physician is at substantial financial risk for the cost of services provided
to Medicare patients that the physician does not provide personally, federal regulations
require the purchase ofreinsurance, as well as other safeguards. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479
(2000).
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incentives were not designed with enough specificity to reward or deter based
on the quality of the trade-off decision."' As Professor Einer Elhauge has
observed, current managed care methods may result in care that is denied as a
means to control costs when the denial will go "unnoticed or unprotested."''
Financial rewards also could be achieved by avoiding high-users of medical
services. Within broad parameters, reducing cost was rewarded by market
incentives without careful examination of the medical outcome of each costconstrained clinical decision or of how cost reductions were achieved.'
C. The Self-Regulatory Response
The legal system looks to physicians' ethical standards to counteract market
incentives to act in ways contrary to their patients' interests.' A review of
current medical ethical standards shows a dearth of direction on responding to
managed care practices. The juxtaposition of medical ethics and market realities
reveals that modem-day physicians confront an inescapable dilemma:
professional norms forbid that which certain market incentives would seem to
demand. Thus, the law and organized medicine seem to be engaged in a child's
game of "see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil"; each has failed to consider
and address the effects of the changed environment on medical practice.
The medical profession does not speak with one voice; thus, there is no
single code of ethical conduct to consult. No fewer than twenty-six physician
groups purport to provide ethical guidance to physicians.' Despite this myriad
of voices and the wide-ranging changes in the organization of health care
delivery and methods of financing health care services that have occurred since
the mid-nineteenth century, the predominant ethical themes have changed little
during the more than 150 years since the AMA's first codified version. The
patient's interest remains the physician's overriding concern. Each physician is

81. Deterrence was left to the tort system and medical malpractice litigation against
the practicing physician.
82. See Elhauge, supranote 1, at 1535.
83. This point was not lost on physicians who argued that financial incentives
should be related to quality of care, not simply cost of care. Quality of care, however,
is notoriously difficult to define and measure. Even if meaningful measures of quality
could be developed, the question would remain whether their use to formulate incentives
would be administratively and economically feasible.
84. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000) ("The check on this
[economic] incentive is a physician's obligation to exercise reasonable medical skill and
judgment in the patient's interest.").
85. The American Medical Association ("AMA") produced the first national code
of conduct for physicians in 1847. Since that time, medical and surgical specialty
associations have also developed codes of ethical conduct or issued statements of ethical
guidance for their members. For a compilation of ethical standards, see MEDICAL
ETHICS, supranote 57.
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directed to "do all that he or she can for the benefit of the individual patient."86
Physicians are given neither permission to nor guidance about allocating health
care resources across a population of patients.
Scholars assert that current ethical precepts direct modem-day physicians
to ignore the cost of care in treating individual patients. 7 But this
characterization of medical ethics is inaccurate. Physician associations
acknowledge cost constraints, while varying in the degree of directness with
which they address the role of cost in clinical decision-making. The AMA is
equivocal, stating only "[w]hile physicians should be conscious of costs and not
provide or prescribe unnecessary services, concern for the quality of care...
should be the physician's first consideration." 8 Other medical associations are
more willing to acknowledge that cost is an inescapable concern. The American
College of Emergency Physicians, for example, acknowledges that the "financial
resources of our society are finite" and accepts "dual obligations to steward
resources prudently while honoring the primacy of the patient's best medical
interests."89 The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons states
unequivocally "it is ethical... to consider cost as one factor in determining
appropriateness of care," recognizing an "ethical responsibility to consider the
health of the public, particularly regarding the allocation of scarce societal
resources."9 The dilemma, then, lies not in legitimizing concern for cost in
clinical decision-making. Cost consciousness is not only permitted; current
ethical standards seem to require it.9 Rather, the oversight gap is in the failure

86. AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Allocation of Limited Medical Resources, Op.
2.03 (1994), in MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 9-10. Other medical organizations
offer slightly different versions of this directive. Obstetricians and gynecologists are told
to "focus on their primary goal of providing quality care." Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists Comm. on Practice Mgmt., Cost Containment in Medical Care
(1996), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS,supra note 57, at 422. The American Academy
of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, whose members frequently care for profoundly
incapacitated patients, are advised that the physiatrist has a "significant responsibility for
the welfare, well being, and betterment of the patient... [which] responsibility should
take precedence over all other aspects of professional practice." Am. Acad. of Physical
Medicine and Rehabilitation Code of Conduct (1995), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS,
supra note 57, at 733.

87. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 15, at 114-17.
88. AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Costs, Op. 2.09 (1998), in MEDICAL ETHICS,

supra note 57, at 14-15.
89. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, Code of Ethics for Emergency Physicians
(1997), in MEDICAL ETHICS, supranote 57, at 223.
90. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Opinion on Ethics: The Orthopaedic
Surgeon in the Managed CareSetting (1997), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note

57, at 602.
91. Going further to recognize a duty not only to the public but also to payers, the
American College of Ophthalmology Code of Conduct opines charging fees for services
for which there is not some substantial benefit exploits patients and payers. Both of these
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to acknowledge and provide guidance in responding to conflicts between the
physician's obligation to an individual patient and her obligations to the public.
Ethical guidelines continue to reject a role for physicians in allocating
health care resources across populations of patients in clinical encounters with
individual patients.9
The AMA, for example, states bluntly "treating
physician[s] ...
should not make allocation decisions." 9 Perhaps in an attempt
to eliminate potential confusion or forestall arguments that published standards
are unintentionally outdated, several codes of conduct include a general
proposition that neither the existence of managed care arrangements or of

features make such practices unethical. Physicians are specifically directed to use the
"most efficient and effective techniques," and to be "parsimonious ... [and] utilizeD the
most efficient means to diagnose ...and treat," avoiding "unnecessary testing,
medications, surgery, and consultations." Am. Coll. of Physicians-Am. Soc'y of
Internal Med., Position Paper: Ethics Manual (4th ed. 1998), reprintedin MEDICAL
ETHICS, supranote 57, at 753, 755.

92. The guidelines state:
Health care resources ...should be used on the basis of individual
patient needs ....Diagnostic and therapeutic decisions should be made on
the basis of potential risks and benefits of alternative treatments ....The
emergency physician has the obligation to diagnose and treat patients in a
cost-effective manner and must be knowledgeable about cost-effective
strategies; but, under the principle of nonmaleficence, the physician should
not allow cost containment to impede proper medical treatment ofthe patient.

Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, Code of Ethics for Emergency Physicians (1997),
reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 224.
93. Both the AMA and medical specialty associations uniformly urge that rationing
decisions be made in a public forum, rather than at the bedside of individual patients.
AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, The Provision of Adequate Health Care, Op. 2.095
(1994), in MEDICAL ETHIcs, supranote 57, at 14 ("Ethical principles require that ajust
process be used to determine the adequate level of health care"; the process should
include "(1) democratic decision making vith broad public input..., (2) monitoring for

variations in care... with special attention to evidence of discriminatory impact on
historically disadvantaged groups, and (3) adjustment... over time to ensure continued
and broad public acceptance."); see, e.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
Comm. on Ethics, Physician Responsibility Under ManagedCare: PatientAdvocacy in
a ChangingHealth CareEnvironment (1996), reprintedin MEDICALETHICS, supra note
57, at 425 ("decisions to ration community health care resources for the purpose ofjust
allocation should be made explicitly within a public forum" and "the needs of all
patients, not financial loss or gain, should be the primary basis of allocation decisions");
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Bioethics, Policy Statement: Ethics andthe Careof
Critically1ll
Infants and Children (1996), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS, supranote 57,
at 650 ("judgments about which diagnostic categories of patients should receive or be
denied intensive care based on considerations of resource use are social policy
deliberations and should be made after considerable public discussion, not ad hoe at the
bedside").
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recently developed financial incentives justifies deviations from standard
principles.94
The universal ethical proscription on physicians' participation in decisions
to allocate medical resources largely ignores present reality. Simple denial
cannot change facts. Physician-managers are charged with allocating medical
care by managing the expenditure of the total premium revenues between
individual patients and the population of enrolled patients, frequently against the
backdrop of the corporate directive to maximize shareholder value."
Incentivized physicians, who bear the financial risk of caring for a population of
patients, confront the necessity of a similar trade-off, against the backdrop of
their own financial well-being. Both physician-managers who make medical
necessity decisions and physicians who bear financial risk for their patients'
medical needs must make determinations, directly or indirectly, about resources
that will be expended on the individual patients and those that will be available
to the patient population. The failure of ethical dictates to acknowledge and to
provide physicians with guidance about this key element of contemporary
medical practice is a serious one. As managed care organizations developed
means to align payers' and physicians' financial incentives to control health care
spending, the juxtaposition of the traditional aspirational method of selfregulation and the current market paradigm created a health care delivery system
at war with itself.
III. Is THE CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
Reliance on ethical standards that fail to address market practices would not
be troubling if the risks that were presented by physicians as cost-control agents
were remote or inconsequential. In this Part, I identify the public and private
concerns that have been expressed about controlling health care spending by
physician-directed limitations on the use of medical services. Although these

94. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, Policy Summaries: Managed Care

(1997), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS, supranote 57, at 227-28 ("The ethical obligations
of emergency physicians do not change when practicing in a managed care or any other
environment."); see also Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Comm. on
Practice Mgmt., Cost Containment in Medical Care (1996), reprinted in MEDICAL

ETHICS, supra note 57, at 422 ("[w]hile striving to contain costs, obstetriciansgynecologists must focus on their primary goal of providing quality care"); Am. Acad.
of Pediatrics Comm. on Child Health Financing, Policy Statement: Principlesof Child

Health Care Financing(1998), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 626
("cost containment is essential but must not impair the quality of care delivered").
95. Even the language adopted by the managed care industry makes it clear that the
trade-off between spending money on medical care and the corporate bottom line is all
too apparent: the percentage of premium spent on providing medical care to patients is
referred to as the "medical loss ratio"; that amount of the premium dollar that is "lost"
to covering insured risks.
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concerns do not justify abandoning market-based reforms, they do warrant an
examination of methods by which these concerns might be addressed.
A major area of concern presents problems of agency, the potential for harm
to a patient due to the under-use or misuse of medical treatment that results from
economic incentives to limit care.'5 Either may occur as a result of
incompetence or action based on a conflict of interest. The typical methods of
assessing medical competency are not in place for many physician-managers.
In contrast to practicing physicians, many states do not require physicianmanagers to hold a license to practice medicine in the state in order to make
clinically based coverage decisions that affect the medical treatment of state
residents.97 In an era characterized by increased medical specialization, the
health care delivery system has relied on institutional peer review to ensure that
licensed physicians' professional activities are limited to areas in which they
have training and expertise. 9 While most practicing physicians are subject to
peer review by hospitals or managed care organizations to ensure that they do
not exceed the limits of their expertise, such safeguards are rare for physicianmanagers. Many managed care organizations do not subject their physicianmanagers to periodic credentialing to assess their general competence.
Moreover, they do not restrict physician-managers medical review activities to
areas ofpractice in which they have clinical training or expertise. In contrast to
the specialization that characterizes medical practice, physician-managers remain
generalists making clinically based coverage decisions across a wide spectrum
of specialty areas in which they may lack training or expertise.
This risk is demonstrated by a review of the facts ofPappasv. Asbe!.' In
Pappas,an emergency room physician, and the neurologist and neurosurgeon
he consulted, concluded that Mr. Pappas was suffering from an epidural abscess
that was pressing on his spinal cord and that required immediate transfer to a
university hospital with capacity and capability to treat the condition." The
health maintenance organization's ("HMO's") physician-manager refused to

96. Risks associated with the competency of the physician are not, of course,
limited to the cost-control context. Medical treatment generally presents risks of overtreatment, under-treatment, inexpertly delivered treatment, and incorrect treatment.
These problems can be addressed by market forces with patients' shunning incompetent
practitioners; laws of general applicability like tort and contract; and self-regulation and
discipline. These mechanisms have more limited application to physician-managers. See
discussion infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
97. See discussion supranotes 62-63 and accompanying text.
98. See generally ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC

INTEREST (2d ed. 1998) (describing specialization in medicine).
99. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacatedsubnom. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa., Inc.
v. Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000), remanded to Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d
1089 (Pa. 2001) (remanded for reconsideration in light ofPegram v.Herdrich,530 U.S.
211 (2000)).

100. See Pappas,768 A.2d 1089, 1091.
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authorize the transfer to the recommended university hospital, although he
agreed to permit the patient's transfer to either of two other hospitals that were
under contract with the HMO; he also declined to speak directly with the
emergency room physician.' Mr. Pappas's transfer was delayed by several
hours while the emergency room staff attempted to locate a hospital that had a
contract with Mr. Pappas's HMO and the capability to treat Mr. Pappas's
medical condition. Mr. Pappas alleged that the delay caused permanent
quadriplegia from the compression of the spine by the abscess."° The physicianmanager was trained in pediatrics. 3 As a practicing pediatrician, it is unlikely
that he would have been permitted by a hospital or a managed care organization
to undertake, or to consult on, a treatment of an adult patient with a neurological
diagnosis. As a physician-manager, his coverage decision effectively controlled
the patient's treatment.
The concern about physician-manager competence is not limited to
decisions about payment, because physician-managers do not always limit
themselves to a "yes" or "no" response to questions about coverage. On
occasion, when recommended treatment is not approved for payment, a
physician-manager will make her own treatment recommendations. For
example, in Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., 104 an insurer
denied pre-authorization for back surgery, which had been recommended by Mr.
Long's attending physician. A physician-manager associated with the insurer's
utilization review agent recommended instead a course of steroid injections.0 5
Mr. Long's physician disagreed, and the consulting physician refused to
administer the injections on the ground that "the injections would be of no
physical benefit ...and could involve some risk."'0 6 Thereafter, the physicianmanager recommended to Mr. Long's treating physician that Mr. Long should
have physical therapy in lieu of the surgery. 0 7 As his condition worsened, Mr.
Long decided to have the surgery without pre-authorization.' The risk, in cases
like Mr. Long's, is that a patient might not receive the care she needs if the
physician-manager recommends inappropriate treatment. The patient might be
influenced by the physician-manager's medical recommendation made in the

101. Id. at 1091; Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
102. The merits of Mr. Pappas's medical malpractice claim have not been
adjudicated. See Pappas,675 A.2d at 711.
103. The district court in Pappasnoted that the record did not "reveal the field of
specialization" of the physician-manager. Id. at 713 n.1. My assertion that the
physician-manager in this case was trained in pediatrics is based on personal knowledge,
verified by representatives of the successor organization to the defendant HMO.
104. 957 P.2d 823 (Wyo. 1998).
105. Id. at 824-25.
106. Id. at 825.
107. Id. at 825-26. The reported opinion did not reach the merits of the plaintiff's
claims.
108. Id. at 826.
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context of a coverage decision, or she simply might be unable to afford care
when payment is not authorized." 9
Concerns about physician-managers are worsened by their disavowal that
they owe any duty to the patients whose care their coverage decisions affect."0
With no clearly defined legal or ethical duty to offset an obligation to the
employer, a suspicious public fears that physician-managers might be influenced
to make coverage decisions that are not consistent with acceptable medical
practice.
Relying on physicians with personal incentives to withhold care raises
similar concerns. Just as physician-managers might be inclined to make
coverage decisions in areas in which they lack clinical competence, practicing
physicians might provide care in areas beyond their expertise when they have
financial incentives to minimize referrals to other physicians."' A practicing
physician's decision not to refer a patient to a specialist for treatment when the
patient's condition is beyond his expertise poses an additional risk not present
when a physician-manager decides not to pre-authorize treatment for payment:
the patient is unlikely to be aware that a decision to withhold care had been
made, eliminating the possibility of appeal or other recourse.Z This conflict is
heightened when incentivized physicians do not disclose their personal
incentives; that nondisclosure, in effect, eliminates the possibility that a patient
might resort to market mechanisms to protect herself by requesting a second
opinion or seeking additional care at her own expense."'

109. It should be apparent that this is a risk akin to medical malpractice by a
treating physician, but current law is not amenable to malpractice suits against physicianmanagers. Many such claims are deemed preempted by ERISA when the patient is
covered under an employee benefit plan. See discussion infra notes 259-68 and
accompanying text. State laws or rulings that medical necessity decisions are not the
practice of medicine shield others. See discussion supranotes 62-64 and accompanying
text.
110. For example, in Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.V.2d 678, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993),
Lewis Hand sued Dr. Robert Tavera, the physician responsible for authorizing
admissions of patients insured by Mr. Hand's managed care plan, for failing to authorize
Hand's admission to the hospital from the emergency room. Dr. Tavera defended against
the claim of malpractice on the ground that he owed Mr. Hand no duty because the two
had never had a patient-physician relationship. Id. The court disagreed, holding that the
Humana Health Plan contract established the patient-physician relationship. Id. at 681.
111. Unlike physician-managers, however, treating physicians can be held liable
under state law for medical negligence for omissions that fall below the standard of care.
Practicing physicians are also subject to state licensure laws and oversight by the state
board of medicine.
112. A full discussion of the nature and scope of these conflicts of interest is
beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent discussion of the conflicts of interest
and ethical dilemmas created for practicing physicians by managed care organizations'
reimbursement methods, see Rodwin, supranote 18.
113. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,522 U.S. 914
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The absence of ethical standards to guide physician conduct in a marketbased system presents systemic concerns, as well. Physicians' bedside allocation
decisions have been criticized for undermining patients' trust in their physicians
and in the integrity of the medical profession as an institution. Similarly,
reliance on physician-managers to oversee treatment recommendations of
practicing physicians has been blamed for a loss of consumer confidence and
trust in the managed care system. Silence has fueled this mistrust. By now,
more than ten years into the shift to a market paradigm for medicine, the public
is generally aware that some physicians have personal incentives to withhold
care. They are also aware that managed care organizations deny coverage based
on their assessment of clinical need. The medical profession has failed to
provide professional guidance or public disclosure about the manner in which
physicians make the required trade-offs. Managed care organizations have
elected to provide little information about the process by or the substance upon
which coverage determinations are made." 4 The resultant mistrust undermines
the ability of the medical profession and the managed care industry to be
responsive to societal needs to conserve health care resources.
IV. CAN THE MARKET CURE ITSELF?
The shift to a market model alleviated financial incentives that contributed
significantly to the escalation of health care spending and brought market
discipline to the formerly unfettered physician-dominated professional model.
The methods used to accomplish these tasks, however, brought with them their
own risks, as well as heightened public skepticism. The debate about those
risks-and in recent years, about health care reform generally-has been
artificially circumscribed by the pervasiveness of market analysis."' My aim in
(1997). Patrick Shea was a forty-year-old man with a family history of heart disease
experiencing severe chest pains and shortness of breath. Id. at 626. He was enrolled in
an HMO, and he asked his primary care physician for a referral to a cardiologist. His
physician declined. Several months later, Mr. Shea died of heart failure. Id. The HMO
in which Mr. Shea was enrolled used physician financial incentives to minimize specialist
referrals. Id. at 627. Mr. Shea was not advised of that fact, nor was he advised whether
his physician's clinical decision was affected by his enrollment in an HMO. Id. Mrs.
Shea alleged that disclosure of the financial incentive would have been enough to cause
Mr. Shea to visit a specialist. Id. The court agreed, holding that the HMO had a
fiduciary duty under ERISA to disclose incentives to limit care. Id. at 629. But see
Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 198 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing
Shea as a case of "special circumstance" based on a specific request, and holding that
ERISA does not impose a fiduciary duty to disclose financial incentives to limit care).
See also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 n.8 (declining to address the question).
114. See discussion infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
115. See M. Neil Browne & Nancy K. Kubaset, A Communitarian Green Space
Between Market andPoliticalRhetoric About EnvironmentalLaw, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 127,
130 (1999) (making a similar observation about the debate concerning environmental
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this Article is to expand the dialogue beyond the limited confines of neoclassical
economics." 6 To advance that initiative,
this Part highlights some shortcomings
7
of market analysis in health care."
A. Market Ideals
Market theory rests on the assumption that the self-interested behavior of
economic actors in the marketplace will yield a socially desirable result:?" that
result is typically characterized as consumer sovereignty." 9 In independent
transactions in a competitive market, self-interested consumers will purchase the
products that they most value, and profit-oriented producers will produce only
those goods and services that consumers desire to purchase and wll do so in the
least costly manner possible.' Products of inferior quality vill be rejected in

law).
116. For a discussion of non-economic values that should be considered in health
reform, see Margaret G. Farrell, The Need for a Process Theory: FormulatingHealth
Policy Through Adjudication, 8 J.L. &HEALTH 201,211 (1993-94) (discussing equity
and distributive justice).
117. The absence of a perfectly functioning market, of course, is not conclusive
given the almost certain absence of a utopian choice of an oversight mechanism. See
generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). Identification of shortcomings in the
economic model also may suggest opportunities for the operation of other models to
compensate for or correct market failures. See Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, What
Does Economics Have To Say About Health Policy Anyway? A Comment and
Correctionon Evans andRice, 22 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 475,477 (1997) ("[]fa
market is not textbook competitive, there is no implication about what the optimal
organization of exchange might be. It might be pure government activity, it might be
pure market activity, or it might be a mixture of the two.").
118. Self-interested behavior is one of the cornerstones of economic analysis, while
the professional model demands that the professional resist self-interested behavior when
it would conflict with ethical responsibilities. See George H. Cohen, When Lav and
Economics Met ProfessionalResponsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 273, 275 (1998).
119. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the PublicInterest,88 CALL. REV. 499,
514 (2000) ("According to the economic model, a well-functioning... market would

promote the ideal of consumer sovereignty."). Consumer sovereignty as an end converts
private preference into national policy. See id. at 591 (making this point about private
preferences for programming in the broadcast market). Private preferences of corporate
purchasers would seem a weak foundation upon which to base national health care
policy.
120. The Coase Theorem, which posits that individual exchanges in a competitive
market will allocate society's scarce resources to their most highly valued uses, is a
principal tenet of the Chicago School that dominates the law and economics movement.
The theorem was developed in Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). I use it here, although the approach I take in this Article is institutional;
I view the market as one possible approach rather than the single ideal approach. See

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

(Vol. 66

favor of better products, and the quality-cost trade-off will occur as a result of
self-interested transactions in the market.
An economic model, implemented through the unfettered functioning of a
competitive market, would seem particularly well suited to the oversight of
utilization-based cost-control processes.12 1 The methods used to control
utilization of health care services developed during the shift from a professional
to a market paradigm for health care delivery; relying on the same market forces
that led to the development of utilization control to shape its functioning is
intuitively appealing. Moreover, the purpose of utilization managementefficient allocation of premium dollars-is consistent with the larger resource
allocation goal of an economic model. Finally, reliance on market forces as a
means of oversight adds less cost to the health care system than does additional
formal regulation; adding oversight costs to the health care system exacerbates
the high cost of health care that utilization controls were developed to alleviate.
An analysis reveals, however, that the market has limited regulatory potential as
a means of addressing the risks of utilization-based controls.
Under current market practices for health care coverage, individual
consumers, or the purchasers who act on their behalf, are not given the
opportunity to select the individual physician-manager who makes the medical
necessity decision or to direct the incentives that each treating physician is
offered. 2 2 That choice is embodied in their selection of a payer and a health
benefit design. Accordingly, problems associated with the substance of the
individual cost-constrained clinical decisions, whether in the context of a
medical necessity decision or an incentivized treatment decision, are addressed
in the current market for insurance coverage only indirectly-by consumers'
rejection of an unsatisfactory managed care organization or benefit design and
choice of a replacement plan."
In the market for health care coverage,
consumers' choices among a range of coverage options would determine the

Leah Wortham, The Economics ofInsuranceClassification: The Sound ofOne Invisible
Hand Clapping,47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 862 (1986).

121. The methods used to control the utilization of health care services depend
upon the type of health insurance coverage purchased by, or on behalf of, health care
consumers. For a discussion of the shortcomings of market forces in controlling the
substantive decisions of professionals, see Ameringer, supranote 39, at 124-27.
122. While consumer-patients remain free to select their own physicians from the
list of participating physicians provided by the managed care organization, they typically
are not provided information about different physicians' philosophies toward cost control
through clinical decisions to make informed choices. Consumers also would be required
to know a great deal more than most do about clinical medicine to comprehend the tradeoffs. See infra text accompanying notes 137-45 (regarding the role of information in the
economic model).

123. For individual consumers to select individual physician decision-makers as
caregivers and as monitors would require significant dismantling of the group insurance
model.
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trade-off between premium cost and restrictions on the use of medical services,
the utilization control processes used by market participants, and the preferred
mix of those control processes."
The extent to which the market produces the economic ideal of consumer
sovereignty, however, depends upon the pattern of market participation."z
Inefficient outcomes-deviations from consumer sovereignty-in an economic
model result from imperfections in market operation, commonly called market
failures. It is axiomatic that the markets for health care services and health care
coverage are rife with imperfections.' 6 In the next section, I discuss four market
failures that affect consumer preferences about managed care and the methods
adopted by managed care organizations to control utilization of health care
services."'
B. FourMarket Failures
In the market for health insurance coverage, little functions as the economic
model predicts. The purchaser is typically not the ultimate consumer. If
purchasers do not reflect the desires of consumers, at least most of the time, then
purchasing decisions might not reflect consumers' preferences among health care
coverage products. Sellers, managed care organizations and insurers, are not
equally happy to sell to anyone who will pay for their product and are
affirmatively anxious to avoid some potential consumers; they are unlikely to
compete for or develop products that are desired by these undesirable consumers.

124. See HALL, supranote 15, at 245-48.
125. See KOMESAR, supranote 117, at 99.
126. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong with a
Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 221, 233 (2000) ('It is elementary health
economics that there are a variety of imperfections in the markets for health care
coverage and delivery. These imperfections affect virtually every aspect of the
relationships between providers, payers, and consumers.").
127. The use of an economic model also has normative shortcomings. An
economic model presupposes that efficient allocation of resources, measured in the
aggregate, is the single desired end project. Efficiency as an end disregards whether the
current distribution of wealth and opportunity is a desirable beginning. It should be
apparent that even a perfectly functioning market would fail to meet the needs of patients
without economic means, including the uninsured and the medically indigent. The
question of how to allocate health care resources, therefore, has an inescapable moral
element that must take into account factors that transcend market efficiency. For a
discussion of normative shortcomings of market analysis in health care, see M. GREGG
BLOCHE, MEDICAL CARE AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY (1999) (Georgetown
University Law Center, Business, Economics, and Regulatory Law Vorking Paper No.
184275), availableat http-//www.ssm.com (discussing the shortcomings of economic
efficiency as a goal for allocating health care resources); Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give
Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 383, 386-88 (1997)
(discussing Pareto optimality).
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Information, especially about the methods of cost control used by third-party
payers, is sparse, leaving consumers uninformed about their options and the
trade-offs embodied in them. Finally, the ability of consumers to take action,
whether on the basis of experience or information, to abandon unsatisfactory
sellers and select more responsive ones is limited.
1. Limitations of Agency
In making decisions about health care coverage, employers act as
purchasing agents for their employees and agents-once-removed for their
employees' dependents." Under traditional common law principles of agency,
the employer would not be considered a bona fide agent. Traditional notions of
agency define an agent as one who is directed to act in the interest of and by the
principal, who retains the authority to control the agent's conduct. 9 Employees
do not direct employers in their choice of health plans, although they may be able
to influence that decision directly through collective bargaining in unionized
workplaces or indirectly as potential employers compete for skilled workers.
Moreover, agents are prohibited from having interests that conflict with those of
the principal; employers have an element of self-interest, as well as a legal duty
to shareholders to maximize corporate value. In purchasing a health benefit plan
for employees, therefore, a corporate employer might be expected to focus more
on the cost of the premium than the quality of the care or coverage provided to
the employees by the plan. 30 Unlike traditional agents, employers who act as
purchasing agents for their employees cannot act solely in their interest and are
not subject to their direct control.'
Despite this limitation, employer-based insurance also has the potential to
enhance consumer sovereignty. Corporate purchasers, particularly those with
large numbers of employees, have significant leverage with which they can
establish and demand compliance with performance standards.' 32 Thus,

128. Some scholars are willing to accept, at least for purposes of argument, that the
employer is an appropriate agent for its employees. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The
Efficiency ofManaged Care "PatientProtection"Laws: Incomplete Contracts,Founded
Rationality, and Market Failure,85 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1999). Others frankly state that
employers are "at best, imperfect agents." See Hyman, supra note 126, at 233.
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §

1(1957).

130. See Erica Worth Harris, The Regulation of Managed Care: Conquering
Individualism and Cynicism in America, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 315, 363-64 (1999)
(discussing agency problems of third-party purchasers and payers); Hyman, supra note
126, at 247 (noting that employees are also concerned about premium cost).
131. ERISA permits employers to act as other than fiduciaries in selecting the
employee benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
132. Although smaller employers have less direct leverage because the purchasers'
power is based on the ability to deliver volume, in the managed care marketplace, private
accrediting agencies can leverage the market pressure of small and larger purchasers to
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corporate purchasers have market power that no individual consumer possesses.
Staff members who are responsible for employee benefits can be expected to pay
closer attention to the specific terms of coverage and the trade-offs between
coverage and cost than the typical individual, thus increasing the likelihood of
a rational purchasing decision."
Corporate purchasers might be expected to mirror the concerns of corporate
employees and, therefore, to reflect their employees' purchasing preferences. As
a theoretical matter, the corporate executives who make coverage purchasing
decisions on behalf of employers should be entitled to receive the same quantity
and quality of medical benefits as other employees. Corporate decision-makers,
therefore, should be expected to share other employees' personal concerns, and
to reflect those concerns in their decisions. In practice, however, the matter is not
so clear. Corporate decision-makers might not be subject to the same rules or
have those rules applied in the same fashion as the vast majority of the
employees they represent. For example, corporate executives who make health
care purchasing decisions have greater influence than other employees over the
payer they are charged with selecting; therefore, they reasonably could expect to
receive more favorable responses to their requests for coverage for health care
services for themselves or their dependents than might be afforded to employees
who are not in a position to influence the employer's purchasing decision."
Furthermore, managed care organizations are willing to provide different benefit
designs for senior executives, and for rank and file employees. When this occurs,
there is less reason to assume that a corporate decision-maker, who is subject to
different and likely fewer spending restraints, would be a good agent for rankand-file corporate employees.
Employers also might be expected to strive to reflect their employees'
purchasing preferences because they have to compete for employees. This is
especially true in a marketplace with low unemployment figures or in a market
segment of highly skilled workers. Because the employee benefit package is an
important factor in that competition, employers should be expected to strive for
a benefit package that satisfies current and attracts potential employees. In
addition, because employers benefit from healthy workforces, they should have
a strong financial incentive to purchase a health benefit plan that meets their
employees' medical needs in order to maintain worker productivity. But here too
there are countervailing considerations. Employers might have a financial
disincentive to attract potential employees (or retain current employees) who
require an inordinate amount of health care services either for themselves or for

affect supplier conduct. See O'KANE, supra note 13.
133. Individuals making decisions about health care coverage suffer from
"bounded rationality." See Korobkin, supranote 128, at 44-51.
134. My personal experience as a practicing lawyer representing managed care
organizations strongly suggests that this is the case.
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their dependents.135 Employers that are self-insured directly bear the costs of that
care, and those who purchase health care coverage bear the cost indirectly
through increased premiums. This disincentive detracts from the effectiveness
of employers as agents, at least for the disfavored employees. Moreover, the
desire to avoid such individuals might deter employers from adopting health
benefit plans that are more generous than their competitors so as not to attract an
inordinate number of "high users."' 36 In short, employers' purchasing
preferences can be expected to mirror those of some of their employees some of
the time. This inevitability of imperfect agency in the current market
configuration for health care coverage undermines a fundamental assumption of
market analysis.
2. Lack of Information
In the fable of the emperor's new clothes, it is left to a young child to
announce what all could see but none would admit. In a similar show of candor,
the United States Supreme Court recently stated that health care rationing is an
immutable characteristic of managed care organizations.' 37 Despite the
increasing amounts of information required by state and federal law, as well as
by private accreditation standards of the National Committee on Quality
Assurance, 138 admissions that managed care organizations ration health care
services and information about how that rationing occurs remain scarce. 39 Both

135. Employees who, or whose dependents, require significant health care services
also might be expected to place a high value on quality of or access to care. It is not
uncommon for employers to inquire about which employees or employees' dependents
incur the highest expenses for health care services. See Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1995) (chief administrative officer examined reports
of employees who had purchased more prescription drugs at a cost in excess of $100 a
month and discovered that an employee suffered from AIDS).
136. These categories of employees and potential employees might include the
aged, the chronically ill, and individuals with disabilities, as well as those with serious
acute illnesses. Many of these individuals would be protected from job discrimination
under federal laws.
137. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,220-21 (2000) ("whatever the HMO,
there must be rationing and inducement to ration").
138. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: DisclosureLaws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1701, 1708 n.18 (1999).
139. In a series of recently filed class action suits against managed care
organizations, there are allegations that managed care organizations engaged in
systematic efforts to mislead consumers about the methods used to control health care
utilization. See, e.g., In re Humana, Inc., No. 00-1334-MD-Moreno (S.D. Fla. Miami
Div.) (on file with author) (managed Care Litigation); see also National Class Action
Filed in Conjunction with Action Filedby ConnecticutAttorney General,PR NEWSWIRE,
Sept. 8, 2000, availableat LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire file (federal class action
suit alleging that managed care-organization-defendants, inter alia, used undisclosed and

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3

32

Agrawal: Agrawl: Resuscitating Professionalism:

2001]

RESUSCITATING PROFESSIONALISM

factors are important to a consumer's informed choice of a health care benefit
design.
The participation of informed consumers is a central concept of the market
model. To fulfill its role in market analysis, information, relevant to a
consumer's choice, must be comprehensible and readily available." The
information of concern in this context is not information about the need for or
proper choice among alternative medical services, but information about the
means used to control the utilization of medical services. 4' For example, if a
pre-authorization and concurrent review process is used to control spending on
and use of health care services, the consumer might wish to know the
qualifications of the decision-maker; the criteria on which the decision will be
based; the right, and processes by which, to challenge a decision; and the rates
of initial denial or pre-authorization for payment and sustained denial after
appeal. 42 If, in contrast (or in addition), the payer relies on physician incentive
mechanisms, the consumer might find information about the existence and type
of incentive, the medical services to which the incentive is tied, and the
consequences to the caregiver of failing to satisfy the utilization targets helpful
in making a decision. To enable consumers to make an informed choice," z this
information should be detailed enough for a consumer to understand the managed
care organization's methods, as well as to make meaningful comparisons among

arbitrary guidelines to deny coverage and provided enrollees with confusing and
contradictory information).
140. The inability of most consumers to comprehend complex medical information
is frequently cited as a partial explanation for physician dominance of health care
delivery. Consumers cannot make informed choices about their health care needs even
when information is available, because they lack clinical insights upon which to base
those decisions. Therefore, they must rely on the judgment of trained clinicians.
Professional ethics and the social contract they form dictate that physician decisionmakers act in the best interests of the patient.
141. See Joan H. Krause, ReconceptualizingInformed Consent in an EraofHealth
Care Cost Containment, 85 Io~wA L. REV. 261, 304 (1999) (noting that patients need
information about their health plan to evaluate risk); Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic
Theory ofInformed Consent in ManagedCare,35 Hous. L. REV. 1631, 1656-60 (1999);

see also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring disclosure). But
see Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 198 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
no duty to disclose and distinguishing Shea); Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F.

Supp. 748, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding no duty under ERISA to disclose financial
arrangements with physicians).
142. Information about the occurrence and rate of undesirable events resulting from
utilization control decisions, such as worsening of medical conditions or deaths from lack

of treatment, would provide a measure of the quality of the utilization decision.
143. Some employees do not have a meaningful choice to make. See infranotes
146-50 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, information would allow employees to
exercise a medical version of caveat emptor to inquire about the basis for treatment or
coverage decisions.
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managed care organizations and between managed care options and any other
coverage type that might be available. This information is not intrinsically
difficult to understand, although some care will be required to disclose the
information in a meaningful way.
Such information, however, is not readily available to individual consumers.
In a study published in 1998 by the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), the
GAO found that the information that managed care organizations made available
to enrollees did not provide explanations of physician compensation
arrangements or even reveal that physicians were given incentives to limit care.'"
The study concluded that consumers were not routinely provided with
information about the business practices, financial arrangements, or service
performance of the managed care organizations from which they received health
care benefits.' 45 In the absence of comprehensive information about the methods
used to control cost by limiting use, reliance on consumer choice to reflect actual
consumer preferences is misplaced.
3. Restrictions on Choice
To achieve the economic ideal of consumer sovereignty, informed
consumers must have choices. Consumer choice is affected by the number of
competitors in the marketplace, consumer access to those competitors, and the
diversity of product offerings. While managed care remains a competitive
enterprise, the number of competitors in the marketplace is decreasing as a result
of industry mergers and consolidations. Even as the number of existing
competitors decreases, the cost of entry for new competitors has increased as
managed care has evolved from a local to a regional or national enterprise.
Major stakeholders in the health care industry, including purchasers and
caregivers, have expressed concern about the effects of the decreasing number

144. GAO/IHEHS-98-137, Consumer Health Care Information: Many Quality
Commission Disclosure Recommendations Are Not Current Practice (Apr. 30, 1998).
145. Id. My own review of materials provided in 1998 to enrollees and potential
enrollees of the HMOs listed in this footnote, supports the GAO's findings, which were
based on an earlier review. I reviewed materials submitted by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of North Carolina; BlueChoice Health Plan and the Blue Choice Option offered
by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia; CIGNA HealthCare; Doctors Health Plan of
Durham, North Carolina; Kaiser Permanente Health Choice of Raleigh, North Carolina;
Optimum Choice of the Carolinas, Inc.; Prudential HealthCare offered in the Atlanta,
Georgia, metropolitan area and Prudential HealthCare HMO in North Carolina;
QualChoice of North Carolina; United Healthcare of Georgia, Inc., and United
Healthcare of North Carolina, Inc.; and Wellpath Community Health Plans (all on file
with author).
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and increasing market share of the major managed care organizations." Industry
consolidation has lessened competition and reduced consumer choice."
Even without a reduction in the number of competitors participating in the
managed care marketplace, the scope of consumer choice is affected by the
decisions of employer-purchasers.' Many employers do not provide options for
health care coverage to their employees.'
Eighty percent of employed
Americans are enrolled in health benefit plans that utilize managed care benefit
designs. Less than forty-one percent of employed workers have a choice of more
than one plan, and even fewer have a choice of a traditional indemnity plan that
does not rely on utilization controls.' An employee without an opportunity to
choose among competing plans is faced with a Hobson's choice between
accepting the health care coverage selected by her employer or rejecting any
employer-provided coverage. 5 ' Accepting the coverage offered says little about
the consumer's preference of health care benefit design or the related methods
of utilization control.
The final element affecting consumer choice is the diversity of the product
offerings of market competitors." The extent of the diversity among managed
146. In Georgia, the state medical association expressed concern that two pending
mergers would give the new combined companies a market share of nearly sixty percent
in two health care benefit designs. MAG Opposes HealthcareInsurance ferger, PR
NEWswvIRE, Oct. 21, 1999, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire file.
Similar concerns were expressed by a business alliance in Florida. Mike Stobbe, Aetna
Buys 1st Placein Healthcare,TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 11, 1998, Finance at 1, availableat
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Major Newspapers file.
147. See Managed Care, Politics and Policy, AM. HEALTH LINF, July 6, 1998,
availableat LEXIS, Nexis Library, American Health Line file (quoting Paul Ellwood,
a developer of the concept of managed care, expressing his "disappointment" with
managed care and the focus on price competition to the exclusion of quality-based
competition).
148. See supranotes 128-36 and accompanying text.
149. See Cathy Schoen &Karen Davis, Erosion of Employer-SponsoredHealth
InsuranceCoverage and Quality, The Commonwealth Fund (Sept. 1998), availableat
http:/Avww.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/schoenerosionib_297.asp (last visited July
10, 1999) (discussing percentages of employed Americans with a choice of health plans).
150. High-income employees, earning more than S60,000 annually, are more likely
than lower-income employees, earning $20,000 or less, to be offered a choice of plans.
Id. And employers with fewer than five hundred workers are less likely than larger
employers to offer their employees a choice ofplans. Id.
151. Health insurance can be purchased individually, although individual coverage
is usually more expensive and less extensive than group coverage. Some individuals,
particularly those with a past history of serious illness, a disability, or a chronic disease,
are likely to have difficulty in purchasing affordable health care coverage, because
extensive questioning of health history is typical.
1 152. Although a wide-range of managed care benefit designs are available in the
marketplace, including HMOs, preferred provider options, and point of service plans, the
differences within each design type, for example among HMOs, in the methods used to
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care benefit designs will be affected by the insurers' desire to avoid adverse
selection.'53 Individuals who are high-users of medical services are not desirable
consumers. Managed care organizations, therefore, have an economic incentive
to offer products that are no more generous than their competitors' products,
because more generous products would be more attractive to undesirable
customers. 54 Similarly, if a managed care organization offers benefit designs
that are less generous than its competitors, it risks a shift of its younger and
healthier enrollees into that product, leaving the product design of average
generosity with a higher-than-predicted percentage of individuals with current
illness or greater likelihood of illness. The resulting rush to conformance lessens
diversity among products and, therefore, consumer choice.' 5
4. Barriers to Exit
An economic model exercises oversight of market participants through the
process of exit: dissatisfied consumers must have the ability to take their dollars
elsewhere as a means to ensure that disfavored practices will be abandoned.
Sellers that fail to respond face loss of valued customers and, if enough
customers exit, elimination as market competitors.' 56 As with choice, if an
employer does not offer options for health care coverage, then a consumer has
little meaningful opportunity to exit; the sole alternative is individual coverage.
The ability to exit is limited even for those consumers whose employers offer a
choice among benefit plans. Employees are usually given the opportunity to
select a health benefit plan at the time of their employment. Thereafter,
employers typically conduct an annual enrollment process that enables

control utilization of services are difficult to discern as a result of the lack of detailed
information made available to consumers.
153. Adverse selection occurs when individuals who believe they are likely to
require a particular insurance coverage are more likely to purchase that coverage than
those who see their risk as remote. When adverse selection occurs, the insurer will incur
insurance losses that exceed the actuarial estimates and, therefore, will earn less than
anticipated profits or suffer a loss. See Wortham, supranote 120, at 844.
154. A comparison of managed care organizations lists of covered benefits will
prove this point.
155. When coupled with employers' economic incentives to avoid health care
benefit designs that are especially attractive to high users of health care services, this rush
to conformance takes on elements of a classic race to the bottom.
156. Exit as a regulatory mechanism is not at its most powerful in the managed
care marketplace. Because some consumers are not profitable to insure, their exit, due
to dissatisfaction with managed care practices, would not prompt a managed care
organization to change its practices. Self-interested behavior would suggest that
managed care organizations intentionally would adopt practices to discourage enrollment
by high-users and to encourage individuals who develop conditions leading to their
becoming high-users to disenroll, at least until the point where this behavior resulted in
the loss of desirable customers.
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employees to make a once-a-year selection of a health care benefit plan. Exit at
other times is possible only through a change of employment to an employer that
offers another health benefit option or through the individual purchase of health
care coverage." s Each alternative imposes significant burdens on the consumer.
An unregulated competitive market should not be expected to result in the
optimal mix of health care benefit designs as measured by consumer preferences,
due to the existence of market imperfections in information, choice, and the
ability to exit. Accordingly, singular reliance on market forces to ensure that
clinical practices accurately reflect consumer preferences for cost-quality tradeoffs is misplaced. Moreover, market mechanisms simply cannot facilitate the
nuanced clinical decision-making that is necessary if a cost-conscious medical
system is to restrict medical care based on the likelihood of producing health
benefits rather than that of avoiding active protest. For that, we must look
elsewhere.
My suggestion is a modest one. I do not suggest that we abandon the
market paradigm for health care, and its contributions to addressing the economic
incentives that result from a third-party payer system. Rather, I recommend that
we consider supplementing the market system with a revitalized self-regulatory
system based on professional norms that charge physicians with making
responsible cost-quality trade-offs and that establish guidelines for mediating
between patient primacy and group responsibility.
V. SELF-REGULATION INMEDICINE
Self-regulation is the means by which a profession establishes the standards
that govern its behavior and the conduct of its individual members. Those
standards serve as powerful professional norms that can be used to explain and
influence the conduct of the individual professional, as well as inform patient and
public expectations about physicians' behavior. Effective health care cost
control will require evolution of professional norms to legitimize cost conscious
clinical decisions and cost-quality trade-offs in the context of individual patient
encounters and to establish guidelines to direct this activity. If professional
norms can be influenced to adapt to changed market conditions and the actual
roles physicians undertake in a managed care system, self-regulation will offer
comparative advantages over market mechanisms and legislative directives to
achieve effective health care spending controls.
Self-regulation holds out the promise of professionalism, institutional
memory, and ethical restraints.'58 But it also raises the specter of self-

157. If a consumer is ill at the time she wishes to exit her current insurer, she may
have difficulty with the health screens that accompany the purchase of individual health
care coverage.

158. Cf. Everette E. Dennis, Internal Examination: Self Regulation and the
American Media, 13 CARDOZO ARTs &ENT. LJ. 697,702 (1995) (discussing the role of
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protectionism and unrestrained spending, which have produced widespread
skepticism about self-regulatory mechanisms. 59 To achieve the benefits offered
by a responsible self-regulatory system, means will have to be devised to ensure
that it serves public needs. In this Part, I define self-regulation and examine both
its promises and its perils. Later, I offer some preliminary thoughts on creating
a responsive self-regulatory system.
A. The Definition of Self-Regulation
A threshold question is definitional: What is self-regulation? In practice,
it has taken many guises, each of which can be classified according to the source
of power for self-regulatory activity and the degree of government involvement
in or influence on the self-regulatory system." "Self' refers to the common
calling or endeavor among the regulators and the regulated. The term
"regulation" refers to deliberate attempts to influence conduct. It entails four key
functions: rule making, policing, adjudicating, and providing notice. In its
purest sense, "self-regulation" refers to entirely voluntary conduct. Membership
in a self-defined group entails an agreement to accept and comply with group
norms that are codified in a code of conduct. In this sense, codes of conduct
adopted by professional associations are examples of self-regulation. Their
standards are aspirations, rather than mandates.'
The policing function is
informal, and the formal sanctions that result from the adjudicatory processes are
limited to expulsion from the group. This is not to say, however, that this type
of self-regulatory activity is without legal effect. Codes of conduct create and
limit expectations about another's behavior. The publication of a private code
of conduct to the general public may give rise to a legally cognizable right to rely

journalism education and training as a type of self-regulatory mechanism for media).
159. Professional self-regulation addresses entry into the profession, adoption and
enforcement of standards of conduct, and discipline for violations of those standards. See
William T. Gallagher, Ideologies ofProfessionalismand the PoliticsofSelf-Regulation
in the CaliforniaState Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV.485, 488 n.2 (1995) (noting the aspects of
professional self-regulation of lawyers). This Article is principally concerned with
adoption and enforcement of standards of conduct as they relate to utilization and cost
control.
160. See generally Margot Priest, The PrivatizationofRegulation: Five Models
of SelfRegulation, 29 OTrAWA L. REV. 233 (1997-98).
161. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Code of
Conduct (1995), reprintedin MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 733 (describing the
code as "a statement of ideals, commitments, and responsibilities.., to patients, their
families, other health professionals, society and to [physicians] themselves").
162. See AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Discipline and Medicine, Op. 9.04
(1994), in MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 47 ("Expulsion from membership is the
maximum penalty that may be imposed by a medical society upon a physician who
violates the ethical standards.").
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on a commitment to the published standards in an individual case." In addition,
the standards set out in ethical codes may be used as evidence of the duty owed,
and breaches of the code of conduct as evidence of a violation of a legal duty."
Courts also have relied on ethical dictates to find the requisite knowledge of
wrongfulness to satisfy intent-based statutes.' 65
Self-regulatory activity need not be entirely voluntary. It may be
encouraged, sanctioned, or required by government action. Legislatures may
elect to rely on self-regulation to capitalize on existing systems, to achieve
financial economies, or to avoid the need to develop bureaucratic expertise.'6
Government agencies may retain the right to direct, to perform, or to oversee
some, or all, regulatory functions. Such regulatory arrangements retain selfdirectedness by the involvement of members of the regulated group, although the
voluntary nature of the activity is moderated by government involvement.'6 The
regulatory standards adopted by the government agency may, but need not, be
those adopted by the profession itself."' When medicine and law are classified
as self-regulating professions, reference is made to both voluntary self-regulation
through professional associations and government-mandated regulation that relies
on state agencies dominated by members of the profession.'

163. See, e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1986) (noting that "affirmatively advertising" the requirements of the Hippocratic Oath
and the AMA Code of Conduct concerning confidentiality means that "a patient can
properly expect his physician to protect... medical confidences"); Culbertson v.
Memitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind.1992) (using the AMA Code of Conduct to define the
medical profession's standard of informed consent).
164. See, e.g., Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1993)
(state board of medicine uses AMA Code of Conduct as evidence of the required
standard of professional conduct).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996) (physician's
conduct is "knowing and willful" within the meaning of the Medicare anti-kickback
statute when he knows that it is unethical under professional standards).
166. Cf.Paul G. Mahoney, The Allocation of Government Authority: The
Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1462 (1997) (noting that government
regulators have a disadvantage in "information, experience and incentives").
167. Depending on the degree of government involvement, due process
requirements may be imposed and legal sanctions may be available for violations of
regulatory standards.
168. Most states have adopted some version of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct promulgated by the American Bar Association. State boards of medicine may
adopt AMA standards in whole or in part, although it is more common for state boards
to refer to AMA standards as one factor in determining whether a physician has violated
a professional obligation. See, eg., Gladieux v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 728 N.E.2d 459,
462-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (ethical principles provide sufficient notice of prohibited
conduct to satisfy due process requirement when state board of medicine sanctions a
physician for failing to conform to "minimal standards of conduct").
169. AMERINGER, supra note 39, at 25 (noting that states enacted legislation to
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That self-regulation exists in multiple forms evinces the mutability of
existing mechanisms. Self-regulatory methods and standards, like law and the
market, are not static. The possibility of government involvement and, therefore,
of democratic processes suggests that self-regulation can be made responsive to
societal needs. The potential for government direction and oversight offers a
means to address self-interested standards and lax enforcement.

B. The Casefor Self-Regulation
To understand why self-regulation offers important benefits in a marketbased system, the initial focus must be on the function that physicianpromulgated standards fulfill for the medical profession and the health care
delivery system, rather than on the current content or enforcement of those
standards. Content and enforcement become important only after self-regulation
is embraced as a viable mode of oversight.
Self-restrained behavior is a method to compensate for long-recognized
factors that interfere with the functioning of a market model in medicine.' In
a managed care system, self-regulatory standards offer a means to avoid a race
to the bottom that could result from financial incentives to do less, especially
when those incentives are coupled with the elimination of a legal floor by federal
preemption of state laws.' 7' In addition, self-regulation provides the professional
norms for medicine that are a powerful determinant of physician conduct.'

establish medical boards in the late 1800s); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799, 801 (1992) (noting that disciplinary agencies under
the auspices of state supreme courts have had the primary responsibility for regulation
of lawyers). Modem-day state medical boards frequently include lay members, although
physicians retain a majority. Id. (discussing the evolution of the modem state medical
board). There are many other examples of government-influenced self-regulation in
medicine. With the Federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11101-11152 (1994), Congress encouraged existing peer review systems by
bestowing a benefit in exchange for fair review processes and reporting of the actions
found to endanger patients. In establishing peer review organizations to review the
necessity for and reasonableness of medical services provided to Medicare beneficiaries,
the federal government utilized a system of audited self-regulation. For a discussion of
audited self-regulation generally and as part of the Medicare program, see Douglas C.
Michael, FederalAgency Use ofAudited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47
ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 174-78 (1995).
170. See infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
171. Managed care organizations are shielded from the effects of state laws that
relate to private-sponsored health benefit plans by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). If the managed care enrollee is not a
beneficiary of a private-employer sponsored health benefit plan, state laws will be
available to pursue complaints against the managed care organization. See infra notes
259-68 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 193-235 and accompanying text.
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Professional norms, therefore, can either facilitate or impede efforts to control
health care spending. Professional norms are also part of a social contract
between the medical profession and the public. If physicians are acting as costcontrol agents," that role and the standards that guide it should be reflected in
the public commitments to medicine. Finally, a system for regulating medicine
that is based on cooperative self-regulation can facilitate voluntary conduct when
deviant conduct would go undetected by market forces and by command-andcontrol regulation.
Although the promise of self-regulation based on professional standards has
been largely ignored in the present-day market model, as originally envisioned
the market-based system was not intended to displace physician leadership and
self-regulation. Rather, professional values were intended to guide a revamped
delivery and financing system that employed economic incentives to reward
preventive care and to control the use of high-cost medical services. In ignoring
or implicitly rejecting this precept, current market participants have created a
system that is fundamentally flawed and at odds with its theoretical
underpinnings.
The ideal medical market has been characterized as an integrative model
based on mutual recognition and acceptance by patients and physicians of rights
and responsibilities, which are enforced by traditional professional values, as
well as market incentives and government regulation. 74 Paul Ellwood and Alain
Enthoven, who provided the intellectual underpinnings for managed care,
acknowledged that physicians were key to the success of any cost-control
system. They envisioned that physicians would make all medical decisions, and
would share financial risk and determine premiums for coverage in conjunction
with insurers based on the covered population's medical needs. Thus, Professors
Ellwood and Enthoven concluded that managed care, as a system to control
spending, could not succeed without "the loyalty, commitment and responsible
' In 1982, health care economist Victor Fuchs agreed
participation of doctors."'75
that "physician-centered control of, and responsibility for the total health care

173. In this Article, I have explained that they are and that in the current market
paradigm, they must. See supra notes 47-56 and 73-80 and accompanying text.
174. See KENNETH E. BOULDING, BEYOND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS ON SOCIETY,
RELIGION, AND ETHIcS 43-52 (1968).
175. Alain C. Enthoven, Managed Care: Wtat Went Wrong? Can It Be Fixed?,
(Nov. 29, 1999) (The Donald C. Ozmun and Donald B. Ozmun and Family Lecture in
Management at the Mayo Clinic), mavilable at http'.//wwv.gsb.stanford.edu/services/
news/EnthovenOzmunLecture.html. According to Enthoven, physicians would control
spending on the basis of clinical determinations about best practices and evidence-based
medicine, by avoiding treatments that were inappropriate or conferred low health benefits
in relation to cost, and through the development of formularies based on medical
judgments of treating physicians. In short, managed care would be a physician-driven
system subject to the traditional constraints on physician conduct as well as economic
incentives. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

41

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

bill" was a key feature of a system to control health care spending. 76 More than
a decade later, Professor Fuchs cited as "one of the greatest errors of health
policy-makers" the assumption that "market competition or government
regulation are the only instruments to control health care."'" Rather, he called
for a "revitalization of professional norms" as an instrument of control.' Even
as they argued for a larger role for market forces in health care delivery, health
care analysts recognized that physician self-regulation would remain both
desirable and necessary in a market-based health care delivery system. Selfregulation fulfills an important function even in a market-based system, although
the changed paradigm would necessitate changes in the content of professional
standards.
1. Self-Regulation: A Traditional Rationale with
Contemporary Validity
Professional self-regulation is not an historical accident: the health care
system adopted a professional paradigm in response to information asymmetries
between patients and physicians, the necessity of honesty and trust in the
treatment relationship, and the benefits of professional cooperation to patients
and to medicine. 79 More than a century ago, the United States Supreme Court
implicitly acknowledged that regulation of the health care industry was required
to compensate for market failures and that self-regulation was an appropriate
means to accomplish the required oversight."' More recently, the Court
reiterated that self-regulation and professional standards are a necessary
The factors that contributed to the
counterweight to economic incentives.'
176. See Victor R. Fuchs, The Battle for Control of Health Care, 1 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 5, 7 (1982).
177. Victor R. Fuchs, Economics, Values, and Health CareReform, 86 THE AM.
Eco.REv.1, 17 (1996).
178. Id.
179. See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertaintyand the Welfare Economics ofMedical Care,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 950-60 (1963). This is a classic article in the field and has
generated much discussion and controversy, perhaps most prominently from Paul Starr
in his influential work, The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine, in which he
argues that professionalism, itself, may cause market failure. This chicken-and-egg
problem need not be resolved for present purposes. Here, I am not arguing for a return
to the professional paradigm; I am merely pointing out that there are sound reasons for
professionalism and self-regulation in a market paradigm.
180. In Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), the Court held that a state
could fulfill its obligation to protect the public health by delegating licensure authority
to members of the medical profession. Id. at 122 ("Reliance must be placed upon the
assurance given by [a physician's] license, issued by an authority competent to judge in
that respect, that [the physician] possesses the requisite qualifications.").
181. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000) ("The check on this incentive
is a physician's obligation to exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in the
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adoption of a professional paradigm will continue to exist regardless of the
method of delivery or financing of health care services. Contemporary managed
care financial incentives heighten the need for professional restraints. A selfregulatory system that influences physician conduct to compensate for
differences between medical care and other market commodities, therefore, is
socially beneficial even in a market-based model.
An information gap exists between physician and patient that is unlikely to
be addressed by regulatory intervention or availability of information in the
marketplace. The complexity of medical information and the rapidity at which
technology changes renders clinical medicine inaccessible for all but a small
percentage of potential patients. This observation is not intended to impugn the
intelligence of the vast majority of the population who is not clinically trained.
It is rather an acknowledgment of the natural tendency of individuals to invest
their time in pursuits other than acquiring medical information when they are in
good health and not in need of medical attention. When an individual is ill,
physical manifestations of illness and emotional issues distract her from a search
for the information that might create an informed medical consumer. Even
consumers who take advantage of newly available medical information from
web-based sources lack the clinical expertise to assess the accuracy of the
information and to make informed judgments about their treatment options.
Moreover, patients, including those who seek out information about their medical
conditions, may choose to rely on physicians and other clinically trained
caregivers to provide information, identify options, and recommend a course of
treatment
Professor Carl Schneider's work on how patients make medical decisions
during a time of serious illness demonstrates that a majority prefers to rely on
trusted physicians to provide information and make recommendations about
care.' Many patients do not wish to be consumers in a medical marketplace.
In the language of economics, a patient's informed choice to rely on her
physician's superior knowledge and medical judgment and to expend her
personal resources on other pursuits can be an efficient one. This option is a
viable one because of ethical standards that demand physician dedication to
patient interests.
Physicians' acceptance of these ethical standards constitutes a moral
commitment to patients under their care."8 3 This moral commitment facilitates

patient's interest.").
182. See generallyCARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OFAUTONO.MY: PATIENTS,
DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DEcisIONS (1998).
183. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Lavs Make Good Citizens? An Economic
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593 (2001) (noting that
internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that leads to more trust in the morally
committed person).
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patient trust. And, patient trust can serve as a replacement for the caveat-emptor
mentality of the marketplace. 4
Trust serves therapeutic goals, as well as providing a partial substitute for
fully informed consumer choice."8 5 A patient's trust in her physician aids in the
process of diagnosis, because a patient is more inclined to be frank in her
discussions with a trusted caregiver. Open discourse assists the physician in
formulating treatment recommendations that are consistent with a patient's
lifestyle and values. 8 6 A patient's ability to draw strength and comfort from a
trusted caregiver enhances compliance with treatment recommendations and is
a source of therapeutic benefit.8 7
Trust is not the only alternative to a fully informed consumer choice. In a
market model, an alternative to trust is monitoring. When consumers cannot trust
sellers to offer high-quality goods and services, and they lack the information
necessary to protect themselves from unscrupulous sellers, they engage monitors
to ensure that supplier commitments are met.188 When patients mistrust their

184. See Ezekiel J. Emanual & Linda L. Emanual, Preserving Community in
Health Care, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 147, 153 (1997) ("Because the physician
is primarily dedicated to the patient's well-being, the patient can be a trusting recipient
of the physician's care, rather than a wary consumer in the marketplace."). If a physician
fails to fulfill these obligations, patients have legal recourse on a variety of different
theories. They also have the ability to report the physician to the state board of medicine.
185. The intra-professional trust that results from professional values of
consultation and cooperation offer patient and societal benefits, as well. The ethical
standard for professional cooperation serves individual patient's medical interests by
requiring consultation and referral to obtain professional assistance when a physician
cannot meet a patient's medical needs. The standards of cooperation and consultation
also compensate for the limitations of market competition as a means to achieve social
goals related to the creation and dissemination of scientific information. See infra notes
256-58 and accompanying text. Where market forces would foster competition for
paying patients as a means to enhance financial well-being and require payment in
exchange for sharing a valuable resource, professional standards require cooperation and
consultation and condemn fee splitting and other economically motivated behavior. In
this instance, the law supports the professional ethic by prohibiting the payment of
referral fees. Tort law also encourages consultation when a physician might be
incompetent to provide the care a patient requires.
186. See generallyJAY KATZ THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984)
(discussing the importance of communication and trust).
187. See Susan Dorr Goold, Commentary, Money and Trust: Relationships
Between Patients,Physicians,andHealth Plans,23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 687,
688-89 (1998).
188. In fact, if consumers trusted managed care organizations, they might be
willing to rely on physician-managers to monitor treating physicians. It takes little more
than reading the daily newspaper or popular news magazines to conclude that trust does
not characterize that relationship. In a forthcoming article, Professor William M. Sage
proposes incorporating medical professionalism into health insurance contracts as a
means to capture the benefits of medical professionalism in a medical marketplace. See
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physicians-whether because of the physician's own suspect behavior or for
reasons that are systemic to the health care industry-they could seek additional
medical care to monitor their physicians' conduct and recommendations.
Monitoring, however, incurs additional costs. In a market model, consumer trust
which results from the ethical dictates of loyalty and service, compensates for an
inherent imperfection caused by uninformed consumers, while avoiding the costs
associated with ongoing monitoring."8 9
Individual patients are not alone in their reliance on physicians' compliance
with ethical dictates. The managed care system also depends on physicians to
behave in ways that are not strictly in their economic self-interest. Managed care
benefit designs were intended to capture financial motivation as a regulating
device. Proponents saw financial motivation as a means to improve quality and
distribution by eliminating services that were not medically beneficial and those
that were not cost effective. But achieving those results requires more than a
change in economic incentives. Physicians have to conduct themselves as
careful, responsible clinicians. If physicians acted solely as market suppliers,
their profits easily could be increased by avoiding ill patients altogether rather
than by carefully monitoring the care provided to them. Physicians also could
achieve financial gains by withholding treatment from patients who were not
likely to notice or to complain, rather than by thoughtfully weighing potential
medical benefit with the cost of achieving that benefit. Their clinical decisions
could be based not on whether a treatment was medically necessary for a patient,
but on whether providing that treatment was economically tolerable for the
physician.
In market theory, managed care organizations could monitor to prevent
these practices, but the industry already has acknowledged that extensive
monitoring is not practical. 9 ' Alternatively, informed consumers would
eliminate these practices from the marketplace by switching doctors or managed
care plans. 9 ' But, the system also has exacerbated the difficulties of consumer

William M. Sage, Therapeutic Coverage: Embedding Medical Professionalism in Health
Insurance Contracts (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
189. See Harris, supra note 130, at 360 & n.230.
190. See Lemov, supra note 81 (noting the decision by United HealthCare to
eliminate utilization review because "micromanaging was not cost effective").
191. In theory, costs associated with poor quality care, resulting either from
withholding of payment for medical services or from cost constrained clinical decisions
that result in harm to patients, would be bome by the managed care organization through
greater costs incurred as a result of worsening medical conditions. The desire to avoid
loss of business and higher health care costs later should lead managed care organizations
to use only those cost-control mechanisms that are acceptable and avoid unreasonable
risks of harm to consumers. The managed care revolution was based on this theoretical
principle. It has not, however, proved accurate in practice. Data reveal that employers
make frequent changes in their offerings of managed care organizations to their
employees. In addition, dissatisfied enrollees are likely to change managed care
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choice, by increasing the concentration of economic resources into the hands of
relatively few payers and their large corporate customers, as well as patient
ignorance, by shielding from public view the mechanisms used to control health
care spending. 9" Responsive markets depend on the ability of a dissatisfied
consumer to shop for a new health plan or a new health care provider. The lack
of competition for high-users of medical services, coupled with the limited
consumer knowledge and the restrictions on the consumer's ability to act on that
knowledge, however, renders the market remedy largely illusory. Thus,
standards developed under the professional paradigm are a method of moderating
the behavior of physicians in ways that compensate for the risks inherent in a
medical marketplace.
2. Self-Regulation: The Evolution of Social Norms
Professional standards established through self-regulatory mechanisms form
the social norms of medicine. Professional norms, like social norms generally,
can explain professional conduct.' 93 For example, Professor Einer Elhauge
traced the continuous development of new medical technology, as physicians
strive to develop improved means to provide care that offers medical benefit
without regard to cost, to the patient-primacy directive. 94 Even in circumstances
when the patient-primacy directive is not consonant with personal financial
interests, physicians are expected to conform their behavior to the ethical
precept.'95 Group norms, and the law, condemn a physician who allows her

organizations when the opportunity to do so is presented. The next-in-line managed care
organization is just as likely to bear the costs that result from the poor performance of its
predecessor in time. Because a managed care organization might avoid the consequences
of its aggressive cost cutting by avoiding coverage of the high-use individual in the near
future, the long-term view and the associated deterrence factor are substantially undercut.
Cf Thomas Bodenheimer & Lawrence Casalino, Executives with White Coats-The Work
and World View ofManaged-CareMedicalDirectors,341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2031

(1999) ("Because patients enrolled in the HMO one year may enroll in a different HMO
the next year, the first HMO might incur the costs of preventive care, whereas the second
HMO might realize the savings."). This phenomenon is another factor in the "race to the
bottom" that is a risk of the current managed care system.
192. See discussion supranotes 142-45 and accompanying text.
193. In this Article for the purposes of analysis, I do not differentiate, aspirational
ethics and state-mandated peer review because they serve a similar function in directing
physician conduct, although they do it in dissimilar ways. Codes of conduct propose
professional ideals appropriate to those who profess a public calling, and state regulations
provide minimal standards of behavior with which individual physicians must comply
ifthey are to obtain and retain the imprimatur of state authorization. The two methods
offer similar benefits and suffer from similar infirmities.
194. See Elhauge, supra note 1,at 1597-98.
195. See supra notes 57-60, 86-88 and accompanying text.
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financial interests to take precedence over her patient's medical needs.'"
Because norms can be used to explain conduct, they also can be used to predict
and to influence behavior in circumscribed conditions. Those who advocate a
pure market model for health care, therefore, underrate two major sources of
ordering professional conduct: internal and group enforcement of professional
norms, including those that embody non-economic values. 97
Social norm scholarship is flourishing, yet scholars have not applied their
insights to the medical profession. Because this section draws on those insights,
the reasons for that apparent inattention warrant examination. One possible
explanation for the lack of scholarly attention to professional standards as social
norms is definitional. In the broadest sense, norms are expectations that govern
behavior, which are enforced by private, rather than public, actors. Some
scholars view decentralized norm formulation as an essential element defining
social norms. Professor Eric Posner, for example, excludes from his analysis of
social norms rules formulated and issued by private institutions. Accordingly,
he would not consider standards formally promulgated by organized medicine
as social norms.19 Professor Melvin Eisenberg takes a similar approach
reasoning that "organizational rules" are similar to legal rules because they can
be enforced by formal sanctions.'" Others disagree and include in their
definition and analysis of social norms rules created by formal private legal
systems in a centralized manner. " Sociologists agree, viewing self-regulation
as the means by which professionals commit to social norms of excellence and
service.2"'

196. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-PhysicianRelationship in an Era of
Scarce Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 349, 353-70 (1993)

(discussing common law theories of tort, contract and fiduciary duty as applied to the
patient-physician relationship).
197. See, eg., Robert C. Ellickson, Law andEconomics Discovers Social Norms,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (stating that contemporary scholarship has underestimated
the importance of social norms and their role in enforcement); Lawrence Lessig, The New
ChicagoSchool, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) [hereinafter Lessig, The New Chicago
School] (arguing that social norms regulate behavior through the enforcement of a
community and that changing norms can change behavior); Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation ofSocial Meaning, 62 U. Crii. L. REv. 943 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Social
Meaning]; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996) (arguing that legal statements can change social norms).
198. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1697, 1700 (1996). His definition would exclude professional norms adopted
through a self-regulatory process, because they are formulated and conveyed by
professional associations and government agencies dominated by physicians. Id.
199. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw andSocial Norms, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1253, 1255 (1999).
200. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Searchfor Immanent Business Norns, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1767-71 (1996).
201. See FREIDSON, supranote 4, at 173-78.
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Definitional exclusions are not the only reason that scholars have not
devoted significant attention to professional self-regulation as a means of social
control. Critics contend that professional standards are suspect because the
physicians who promulgate them are motivated by self-interest.2" Social norm
scholars may shun the study of professional norms because of suspicions about
their formation or content. Neither definition nor motivation, however, is an
adequate ground to eschew the insights of social norm theorists in considering
the benefits of self-regulation and professional norms.
Professional standards are a hybrid of legal rules and social norms,
exhibiting characteristics of each. The common characteristics of professional
standards and social norms, however, are the ones most relevant to the present
analysis. Social norms are created through group consensus without formal
means of formulation or change. Professional norms are also built upon group
consensus, but they are created through institutions based on formal mechanisms.
The intentional formation of professional norms, while differentiating them from
a narrow definition of social norms, also might make them more subject to
external influence and intentional change to reflect new social demands. Like
social norms generally, professional norms evolve over time in response to
changes in the external environment. Professional norms, for example, have
evolved in response to changes in the law. After the enactment of the Ethics in
Patient Referral Act, which prohibited physician referrals to certain facilities with
which the physician had a financial relationship, professional standards
condemned such referrals, as well. 3 They also have evolved to acknowledge
the validity of cost considerations in clinical decision-making, although, to date,
they have not evolved to address societal allocation decisions based on cost of
24
care.

0

Unlike social norms, however, some professional standards can be enforced
formally through legal sanctions, as well as informally through praise and shame.
The theoretical possibility of formal enforcement is largely irrelevant to the role
that professional norms assume for the medical profession. The formal sanctions
available to professional medical associations are limited in scope and effect to
exclusion from membership. Because fewer than thirty-three percent of
physicians belong to the largest medical organization, the AMA, it is reasonable
to conclude that if physicians comply with ethical dictates it is more from a sense

202. See, e.g., Shimm & Spece, supranote 56, at 60-65.
203. Compare Ethics in Patient Referral Act, amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn
(1994) (prohibiting referrals to entities with which a physician has a financial
relationship, with some exceptions), with AMA Principles of Med. Ethics, Conflicts of
Interest: Health Facility Ownership by a Physician, Op. 8.032 (1994), in MEDICAL
ETHICS, supra note 57, at 36 ("physicians should not refer patients to a health care
facility which is outside their office practice.., when they have an investment interest
in that facility").
204. See discussion supranotes 86-94 and accompanying text.
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of obligation than from fear of exclusion.' Disciplinary actions by state boards
of medicine, likewise, affect few physicians. As Professor David Orentlicher
explains, the principal activity of medical associations and state boards of
medicine is standard setting, not enforcement20
Moreover, professional
standards serve a fimction analogous to other groups' social norms. They foster
group consciousness and integration as a means to inculcate group values,2" and
they impart a sense of obligation and responsibility that leads to internalization
and compliance.2 8
Self-interested motivation in the formation of professional norms does not
provide a validjustification to ignore them as a determinant of physician conduct
in a market-based system. 9 This is not to say that economic incentives are
irrelevant to the formation of professional norms, or to the behavior of
economically rational physician actors. None of the alternatives for guiding
physician conduct, however, is free of self-interested actors. The market
paradigm depends on the actions of self-interested actors motivated to increase
personal utility, generally defined in terms of wealth maximization. A legislative
paradigm depends on the decisions made by elected officials who are influenced
by special interest groups, including among them both organized medicine and
the managed care industry. Yet society does not reject either the market or law
as valid means to direct and constrain conduct. When the question is which
institutional method, or what combination of institutions, to use to achieve a goal,
the motives of individual actors are subsumed in the process of institutional
decision-making and the character of the institution.
Professional norms are developed through processes of self-regulation.210
Self-regulation involves a collective engagement in developing, enacting, and
enforcing professional standards, which are embodied in the rules of professional
conduct or accepted clinical standards. Engaging in the process of self-regulation
fosters moral decision-making. Moral decision-making, in turn, enables the
decision-maker to resist demands to deviate from accepted group norms" In

205. Michael Catanzaro, What's Up. Does?: The Democratizationof the AA,
NAT'L REV., May 14,2001, at 28,28.

206. See David Orentlicher, The Ifluence of a ProfessionalOrganizationon
PhysicianBehavior,57 ALB. L. REv. 583, 605 (1994).
207. See Barry R. Furrow, GoverningScience: PublicRisks andPrivateRemedies,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1411 (1983) (describing the characteristics ofa profession).
208. See Herbert Swick, Academic Aedicine Must Dealwith the Clash ofBusiness
and ProfessionalValues, 73 ACAD. MED. 751, 751-53 (1998) (arguing the importance
of professional values to health care delivery).
209. For a discussion of the role of motive in a comparative institutional analysis,
see KOMESAR, supranote 117, at 58-65.
210. A profession or other shared enterprise has at least three reasons voluntarily
to engage in self-regulation: self-protection, avoidance of government regulation, and
development of shared social norms.
211. Cf. Wilkins, supra note 169, at 852 (1992) (recounting commentators'
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other contexts, social norm scholars have demonstrated that discussion among
members of a group increases group identity and raises the level of cooperative
behavior by as much as eighty-five percent."' Similar results can be observed
in medicine. In organ transplantation, shared clinical measures are used to
dictate a patient's position on the list that establishes the priority to receive an
organ. Transplant surgeons have both economic and personal motives to favor
their own patients: economic motives because when a transplant is performed,
the transplant surgeon receives a fee; personal motives because of the long-term
relationship between patient and physician that is usually fostered during a
serious illness of this type. Despite personal motivations to the contrary,
transplant surgeons are expected to report accurately on their patients' status as
measured against the agreed-upon criteria, and to resist the temptation to misstate
a patient's medical condition to secure a preferred position. And, as a general
rule, they do so."' This example also demonstrates the application of two other
principles of social norm theory. Once formed, group norms substitute for
independent evaluations of each choice with which a group member is
confronted.1 4 Internalization of professional standards facilitates decisionmaking when decisions cannot be mechanized because of their complexity, the
requirement to exercise judgment, and, in the organ transplant example, the
potential for disagreement about the relative weight of various factors.2" 5 Selfregulation in medicine, therefore, can lead to cooperative behavior, resistance to
demands contrary to accepted standards, and consistent decisions in complex
situations.
The degree to which these results are achieved will depend upon physician
internalization of professional norms. The concept of internally enforced norms
posits that actors follow social norms that are inconsistent with wealthseeking/cost-avoiding incentives because they internalize the social norms of
their communities. Scholars believe that internalization of professional standards
occurs if the individuals to whom the standards apply are socialized through
professional education to embrace professional norms; if they are active

justifications for lawyer self-regulation).
212. See Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fallof Self-Interest in the Explanation
of PoliticalLife, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 17 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
213. This example is based on my personal experience as counsel for a statewide
organ procurement organization. For at least five years, I attended every board meeting
at which these matters were discussed. During this period, only two instances of false
reporting were uncovered. The other transplant surgeons dealt swiftly and harshly with

each.
214. See Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social
Conflict, 144 U.PA. L. R~v. 2079, 2100 (1996) (group members act in conformance with
existing group norms "on the assumption that existing practices have already survived

a trial-and-error test," reflecting the "cumulative wisdom of the community").
215. Cf William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy,and Class in the Welfare
System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1240-41 (1983) (discussing welfare administration).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/3

50

Agrawal: Agrawl: Resuscitating Professionalism:
2001]

RESUSCITATING PROFESSIONALISM

participants in a strong professional culture, subject to peer pressure to encourage
compliance; and if they receive relatively high status and reward from their
membership in the profession.216 Physicians satisfy each condition. Individual
physicians, beginning in their medical education and throughout their
professional lives, are socialized to internalize professional standards and
values.21 7 Peer review is the preferred method of physician oversight in the
institutions in which physicians practice and is also encouraged and relied upon
by the federal government.2t3 Moreover, medicine is generally rated as one of
the highest status occupations in public surveys.219 Thus, physicians may be
expected to internalize professional norms established through self-regulation in
much the same way that members of other closely-knit communities embrace the
social norms that define acceptable and unacceptable behavior in their
communities. When professional standards are internalized, physicians may be
predicted to take pride in fulfilling them, and to suffer guilt and shame at falling
short of them, creating an internal enforcement mechanism for professional
norms 0
The medical community serves as an external enforcer of professional
norms through rewards of professional esteem and enhanced reputation and
punishment through professional condemnation. Professional esteem and
reputation are powerful determinants in medicine. Physicians as a group are
keenly concerned about the place of the medical profession in the societal
hierarchy.
The individual counterpart of that group concern is intraprofessional standing determined by peer evaluation. In economic terms,
individual compliance with professional standards provides a non-monetary
subsidy in the form of positive esteem that exceeds the cost of the foregone

216. See id at 1242.
217. See, e.g., Robert L. Cruess & Sylvia R. Cruess, Teaching Medicine as
Profession in the Service ofHealing,72 ACAD. MED. 941,949-50 (1997) (arguing that
the objective of medical education is to ensure that all physicians understand
professionalism and accept its obligations).
218. The federal government encourages physician peer review by providing
qualified immunity from monetary damages to participants in the peer review process.
See Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11111 (1994). The
Medicare program relies on peer review organizations made up of physicians to oversee
the reasonableness of and necessity for medical services billed to the Medicare program.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
219. Physicians generally enjoy an above-average income, enabling them to resist
self-interested economic influences more readily than those who are significantly less
affluent. Cf.Mansbridge, supranote 212, at 255-60 (discussing the "luxury" theory of
altruism).
220. See Orentlicher, supra note 206, at 538.
221. See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE A STUDYOFTHE SOCIOLOGY

OFAPPLIEDKNOVLEDGE5 (1988) ("Ifwe consider the profession of medicine today, it
is clear that its major characteristic is preeminence," with respect to prestige, as well as
expertise.).
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financial incentive, while noncompliance imposes a non-monetary tax through
loss of esteem.'
Social norms have been cited by scholars to explain a widerange of individual conduct, from why individuals voluntarily contribute to
public radio, to why they refrain from littering or return items to lost-andfound.' Given the importance of professional esteem to physicians and the
benefits that flow from enhanced professional reputation, professional norms
should have a powerful effect on physician behavior." Although there is little
empirical evidence to test this hypothesis, commonly observed behavior when
physicians act contrary to a wealth-maximizing model suggests that it is an
accurate prediction.m
If professional esteem and self-regard did not compensate for financial
reward, one would predict that physicians in a marketplace that financially
rewards providing fewer services would seek out healthy patients who do not
require medical intervention. 6 Physicians also would seek the highest paying
positions and would not put themselves in harm's way without (and perhaps even
with) significant economic reward. Professional standards, however, impose a
rule of rescue, and the professional community provides recognition and psychic
rewards to the professional who undertakes the complex task of caring for
patients with difficult conditions or who fail to respond to traditional therapies."
That physicians seek positions with teaching institutions and multi-specialty

222. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law andBehavioralScience:
Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law andEconomics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051,
1129-30 (2000).
223. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Law andEconomics DiscoversSocial Norms,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 539-40 (1998).

224. Scholars have shown that social norms are at their most powerful when
participants engage in repeated, readily observable interactions and have similar values
and interests. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 156-66 (1991). While physicians share similar values, they engage in

a wide-variety of complex tasks; however, the practice of peer review makes those
transactions observable to a subset of other physicians.
225. Some empirical work has been done with corporate actors and individual
executives. The results indicate that loss ofreputation and adverse publicity are powerful
deterrents. For a discussion, see BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF
PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983). Professor Robert Cooter notes in a recent

article that another group of professionals, lawyers, act contrary to wealth maximization
in abandoning lucrative private practices for the bench. See Robert Cooter, Do Good
Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis ofInternalized Norms, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1577, 1578 (2000).

226. This is much like insurers behave in seeking to avoid high-risk patients.
Certainly, some physicians do behave in this manner, just as some physicians were
motivated by the incentives inherent in fee-for-service medicine to provide medical
services that provided no medical benefit. Norm compliance, like legal compliance, will
always be less than one hundred percent.
227. See FREIDSON, supranote 4, at 176-78.
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group practices, like the Mayo Clinic, which offer lower compensation than other
occupational choices, is evidence that professional prestige matters.2 That
physicians donate their time, even without any compensation, to treat certain
"difficulf' and therefore "interesting" cases provides further evidence.228 And it
would be difficult to conceive of an economic incentive large enough to motivate
a physician to confront a ward full of patients suffering from the Ebola virus or
other highly contagious diseases; yet many have done and continue to do so.
Professional norms of service and altruism can be used to explain why physicians
render some medical services without expectation of payment, why physicians
render medical services to strangers in emergency situations, and why physicians
are willing to expose themselves to infectious agents in the care of their
patients.8" None of these observed behaviors can be attributed to a desire to
maximize personal wealth, and some are counter to that goal.2 8 '
Social norm theorists have shown that individuals All ignore or attempt to
circumvent efforts to influence their conduct when they consider those efforts
illegitimate or philosophically inconsistent with their beliefs and values 82
Behavior consistent with this prediction can be observed in medicine. Economic

228. See Paul Roberts, Profile ofMayo Clinic, NAT'L POST, Apr. 1, 1999, at C12

(noting that Mayo physicians are salaried).
229. After the Oklahoma City bombing, for example, a New York dermatologist
who was an expert in the surgical use of lasers to remove powder bum scars donated his
services to treat bombing victims. See Karen Klinka, New York Expert Joins City Doctor
To Fix Bomb Scars, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 9, 1995, at Al.
230. For an anecdotal account of one medical student's introduction to the
expectations of a physician in an emergency situation, see MELVIN KONNER, BECOMING
A DOCTOR: A JOURNEY OF INIATION IN MEDICAL SCHOOL (1987) (author describes
being chastised by his physician-preceptor for his failure to identify himself as a secondyear medical student in response to an airline pilot's inquiry whether there was a doctor
on board). If you question the power of this ethical dictate, observe the number of call
buttons that are pushed the next time you travel by airplane and the pilot asks physicians
on board to identify themselves. I saw many examples of the internalization of the
professional ethic to render medical services in an emergency in my own legal practice
representing physicians. One of the more poignant occurred in an airport terminal where
I was seated next to my physician-client who appeared to be asleep after a particularly
long day. When an announcement was made seeking a physician who spoke Spanish to
respond to a medical emergency, I watched my physician client, whom I had not known
spoke Spanish, awake instantly and hurry across the crowded terminal to the designated
spot. I observed several other people making the same trek. A quick discussion of
specialties yielded the identification of the most appropriate caregiver.
231. Not every physician is moved to respond to these professional norms in every
instance, but enough physicians are in a sufficient number of instances to suggest the
overall successful inculcation of the expectations that arise from these shared
professional norms.
232. Cf Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory ofEnvironmentalEnforcenent,71 S. CAL L. REV. 1181, 1192(1998) (explaining
resistance to voluntary compliance with economic regulation).
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incentives to limit care are contrary to prevailing norms with the predictable
result of obstructionist conduct. Recent survey data suggest that a sizeable
minority of physicians collude with their patients to obtain reimbursement from
third-party payers by exaggerating the severity of a patient's condition, reporting
signs or symptoms that the patient did not exhibit, or misstating a patient's
diagnosis." Physicians who admit to engaging in such conduct justify their
conduct on the ground that the patient-primacy directive demands it. Although
the validity of that justification is highly doubtful and the economic incentives
for the conduct should not be overlooked, these findings indicate a need for both
norm change and attention to means of securing compliance with society's
efforts to control health care spending.
The argument that professional standards function as social norms for
medicine is a pragmatic one. I do not maintain that all existing professional
standards are socially efficient." Nor must I prove that professional standards
do not externalize costs." The point is merely that professional standards do,
and should be expected to, influence physician behavior. 36 Regulatory systems
that run counter to strongly held values should anticipate evasive, manipulative
conduct as actors attempt to get around the system. 37 Self-regulation, therefore,
233. See Mathew K. Wynia et al., PhysicianManipulationofReimbursement Rules
for Patients: Between a Rock and a HardPlace,283 JAMA 1858, 1861 (2000). Such

reasoning ignores that this practice harms the population of patients covered by a
particular payer by reducing the funds that are available to care for the group. It also
ignores that such conduct is likely unlawful if it leads to the submission of false claims
for payment from third-party payers. Finally, surreptitious conduct is likely to disguise
any possible flaws in coverage policy or design that might be brought to light if coverage
denials were confronted on the merits.
234. See Posner, supranote 198, at 1706 (discussing an argument that people in
closely-knit communities have an incentive to choose norms that maximize joint
welfare). Physicians, like members of closely-knit groups generally, have an incentive
to adopt professional standards that maximize their joint welfare. For example, by
adopting the patient-primacy rule, physicians maximized their personal income as long
as patients were able to pay for their services whether through insurance or personal
financial resources. They also gained status within society by portraying the profession
as altruistic and other-serving.
235. See Posner, supra note 198, at 1723. Physicians, again like other
communities, have an incentive to adopt professional standards that externalize costs.
Thus, they have to date formally rejected responsibility for allocating scarce resources.
The rejection of that task is efficient for the group because it shields them from the loss
of public esteem that has accompanied those who attempt to allocate health care
resources. Nonetheless, that professional standard is not desirable for society as a whole,
because attempts at allocation will fail without physician cooperation.
236. That some physicians fail to follow ethical precepts is no more a reason for
rejecting professional self-regulation than is the observation that some individuals fail
to comply with the law a reason for rejecting legal regulation.
237. See FREIDSON, supra note 221, at 442 (referring to empirical studies showing

that individuals do not passively obey systems to which they feel no loyalty).
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must figure into a system of control when cooperative physician behavior is
essential to achieving a social goal. Until the centrality of social norms is
recognized, the complex task of influencing professional standards to be
responsive to social needs cannot begin. The task of those who would use
professional standards to initiate a professional response to societal desires to
control health care spending is to determine how to influence norm change, a
topic to which I turn in Part VI.
3. Self-Regulation: Comparative Institutional Advantages
Examining the physician behavior that will be required to address health
care spending further illuminates why self-regulation as a system of oversight is
well positioned to respond to the need to control health care spending by
controlling the use of health care services." Health care spending control, based
on limiting use of health care services, depends upon a series of seemingly minor
clinical decisions: a decision not to order a particular diagnostic procedure, to
engage in watchful waiting before initiating treatment, to withhold a treatment
that promises a small benefit in comparison to its cost, or to perform the least
costly of altemative treatments. 9 Physicians must be empowered and, on
occasion, encouraged to say "no" to the demands of their patient-customers in
order to avoid self-prescription of wasteful, inappropriate, or harmful tests,
treatments, or medications. The cumulative effect of minor acts of medical
irresponsibility will result in major expenditure on health care.2
Such cost-conscious clinical decisions will be a necessary but not a
sufficient method of addressing health care spending. They respond to the desire
to contain costs based on current information, but do not offer insights into
allocative or social efficiencies. Sound allocation decisions will depend upon the
development of scientific knowledge about how best to use health care resources
to minimize financial waste and maximize medical benefit.24 Many current
medical practices lack sound scientific justification, because medical science is
imprecise. Diagnostic and treatment decisions are based on probabilities, rather

238. For purposes of this discussion, I refer to clinically responsible methods to
limit health care spending, rather than methods that rely on the path of least resistance.
See discussion supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (cost can be controlled by
limiting treatment in cases in which patients are not likely to discover that beneficial care
was withheld or are not likely to protest).
239. See HALL, supranote 15, at 117-19 (discussing the nature of bedside rationing
as Hall envisions it).
240. For purposes of this section, I assume that professional standards can be
influenced to acknowledge that cost control is a desirable end in which physicians should
participate. See infra text accompanying notes 297-301 (discussing how that might
occur).
241. See KOMESAR, supranote 117, at 5-6 (identifying the "correct question" as

which of the imperfect alternatives is better or worse at achieving a goal).
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than absolutes. u 2 Ongoing research and dissemination of scientific information
will be required to improve medical decision-making in a continual effort to
eliminate financial waste and to identify best medical practices.
The inquiry for comparative institutional analysis, then, is which institution
is most likely to lead to the behavior that results in achieving the social goal.243
Here, achieving cost control requires, in the short term, a myriad of small clinical
decisions made in the course of treating individual patients and, in the long term,
a commitment to acquiring and sharing new knowledge. Self-regulation offers
two advantages over other control mechanisms as a means to facilitate costconscious clinical behavior. First, self-regulation is most likely to lead to
voluntary compliance. 2' Second, professional standards are more likely than
market forces to facilitate the generation and sharing of new medical knowledge.
Even in a regulated medical marketplace, therefore, self-regulation and
professional norms can influence physician conduct in ways that affect costcontrol efforts.
Voluntary compliance is essential when behavioral deviations cannot be
detected by market participants or through regulatory oversight. The clinical
decision-making process is largely shielded from public view.245 Managed care
organizations have conceded that physician-managers' oversight of each of the
many clinical decisions made by treating physicians in the ordinary course of
medical practice is not feasible. 2" Patients lack financial incentives to exercise
their buying power to control clinical conduct; more to the point in this context,
they lack the specialized knowledge necessary to make the multiplicity of

242. This lack of scientific evidence to support many medical practices has been
offered as an argument for the use of physician-managers and third-party payers to
oversee treating physicians. This argument proves too much. That medicine is at least
as much art as science says nothing about whether the better decisionmaker is the treating
physician or a third party. There is no reason to believe that a profit-seeking organization
is a better decisionmaker than a profit-seeking caregiver. The use of financial incentives
to reward cost-conscious decision-making has addressed the profit-seeking caregiver
problem.
243. See KOMESAR, supranote 117, at 5-6 (identifying the "correct question" as
which of the imperfect altematives is better or worse at achieving a goal).
244. Voluntary compliance is also important when the system relies more on
preventing than punishing wrongfil conduct. See Priest,supranote 160, at 265 (arguing
that cooperation is preferred when preventing harm is more important than punishing
wrongdoing after harm has occurred).
245. While minor acts of noncompliant behavior are likely to escape notice, gross
or repeated errors in medical judgment or intentional harmful acts are likely to come to
the attention of regulators through patient or peer reports and through the tort system.
246. See supra note 74. Attempts to impose excessive controls are also likely to
generate antipathy on the part of treating physicians, and feelings of antipathy will
undermine cooperative compliance. Use of controls, therefore, would be efficient only
if the controls would detect and countermand more acts of noncompliance than would
result from voluntary compliance.
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choices that are required to achieve health care spending control. Market
mechanisms, therefore, are ill suited to ensuring that cost-conscious clinical
decision-making will occur on a regular, ongoing basis, because they cannot
effectively direct compliant behavior or detect non-compliant behavior.
Rule-based command-and-control systems are also likely to fail.
Formulating rules for medical conduct is undesirable because they could obscure
the need for physicians to respond creatively and flexibly to the particularized
clinical and personal needs of individual patients.247 Moreover, the complexity
of factors that affect medical judgment cannot be specified categorically, which
makes the promulgation of rules infeasible.2 ' In addition, rule-based systems,
which tend to rely on inspections, would be unlikely to uncover violations even
if rules could be formulated. 2 Scholars long have recognized that tasks, which
require technical expertise and do not lend themselves to standardization, must
be organized in a way that motivates individual responsibility? Cost-conscious
clinical decision-making involves just such tasks.
Physicians are also more likely to respect and respond to the judgment of
their professional peers than to the dictates of persons or entities that do not
possess clinical expertise; self-regulation in medicine, relies on professional
peer review and professional standards'
Systems that rely on actors who are
not highly regarded, in contrast, are more likely to generate apathy or antipathy,
each of which undermines cooperative behavior. Because voluntary cooperation
offers the most effective means to combat minor acts of irresponsibility that
would go undetected in the marketplace and by command-and-control type
regulation, a self-regulation system, which promotes voluntary compliance and
responsible behavior, is preferable to both.s

247. See FREIDSON, supra note 221, at 435 (arguing that a bureaucratic model,
which is based on rules and regularized processes, forfeits professional discretion and
objectifies patients).
248. In addition, reliance on rule-based systems would require rule makers who
possess technical expertise and medical knowledge.
249. See Priest, supranote 160, at 265 (arguing that cooperative implementation
has the greatest potential vhen inspections will not detect violations).
250. See FREIDSON, supra note 221, at 435, 461 (discussing progressivefunctionalist views); see also William H. Simon, Ethics, ProfessionalismandMeaningfid
Work, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 445, 460 (1997) (discussing the organization of work of
professionals and self-regulation by lawyers).
251. See Hall, supra note 31, at 536 (noting that physicians are resistant to lay
influence). Methods that result in apathy, like those that result in antipathy, are likely to
undermine cooperative compliance.

252. See David Orentlicher, The Role of Self Regulation, in REGULATION OF
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 129 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997) (noting that physicians are
more likely to comply with standards formulated by their professional peers).
253. See id.
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Self-regulation is also more likely to promote the generation and sharing of
new knowledge that is necessary if the health care system is to focus on costeffectiveness, as well as cost containment. The market has contributed to the
possibility of medical outcomes research through well-designed utilization
management systems that permit the collection and analysis of large amounts of
data to identify medical best practices and to eliminate ineffective treatments.
Marketplace competitors, however, are not committed to developing knowledge
that does not offer a competitive advantage or sharing knowledge that could
provide them an economic edge. 2s In contrast, traditional professional norms
encourage the development and sharing of medical information that has the
potential to enhance the scientific basis for medical treatment and for resource
allocation. 5s The professional norm of cooperation, therefore, serves the public
good by requiring prompt dissemination of new scientific information, including
information that can be used to eliminate wasteful medical treatments and to
identify treatments that yield medical results comparable to the alternatives at
less cost. As outcomes research becomes available to inform a wider range of
health care allocation decisions, the rapid regulatory responsiveness offered by
self-regulatory systems will foster both good medicine and sound social policy. 6
4. Self-Regulation and a Problem the Law Created
Self-regulation also might offer an opportunity to address partially an
instance of questionable social policy. Federal law has provided a perverse
argument in favor of self-regulation in the context of health care spending
controls initiated by physician-managers. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") broadly preempts state laws that relate to
private-employer sponsored benefit plans and substitutes a narrow-range of
ERISA causes of action and remedies." 7 State law challenges to the coverage
decisions of managed care organizations have been preempted, without regard
to whether those decisions concerned simple contract interpretation or reflected
a physician-manager's medical judgment about the necessity of treatment for an
individual patient.2" 8

254. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77, 91-94 (1999) (discussing
scientific research norms and the risks posed by commercial enterprises).
255. See David Blumenthal, The Vital Role of Professionalismin Health Care
Reform, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 252, 253-56 (1994) (identifying the values of
professionalism as altruism, commitment to self-improvement, and peer review).
256. Cf. Michael, supra note 169, at 184 (noting that the expertise of selfregulators gives them the ability to modify rules in response to change more rapidly than
government agencies).

257. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1453 (1994). A complete discussion of ERISA and ERISA
preemption is beyond the scope of this Article.

258. ERISA does not preempt state law challenges to the conduct of physicians
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Despite the generally broad preemption of state laws, however, some recent
court decisions have suggested that traditional areas of state regulation, like
physician licensure and discipline, might not fall within the scope of ERISA
preemption. At least two courts have held that a managed care medical director
making medical necessity decisions is subject to the jurisdiction of his peers on
the state board of medicine. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has noted, in dicta, that while 'ERISA preempts malpractice suits against
doctors making coverage decisions... it does not insulate physicians from
accountability to their state licensing agency or association charged to enforce
professional standards regarding medical decisions."' O Accordingly, if
congressional intent to preempt state-mandated self-regulation is not established,
physician-managers will be subject to the same licensure and disciplinary
standards as their physician peers in more traditional roles. This would enable
the states to oversee the clinical decisions of physician-managers who are
otherwise immune from challenge under state law, including medical malpractice
law 2 61
In a related development, the United States Supreme Court has suggested
that medical necessity decisions might have more in common with clinical
decisions than with ERISA plan administration. In Pegramv. Herdrichpthe
Court acknowledged a distinction between clinically based coverage
determinations and routine benefit determinations in managed care plans.W The
Court stated "[p]ure 'eligibility decisions'" are those made to determine whether
a managed care organization covers "a particular condition or medical procedure

providing treatment to patients, even if those patients are enrollees in an ERISA plan.
If, for example, an incentivized physician harms a patient by limiting care, she can be
held liable for medical malpractice.
259. Murphy v. Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs of Ariz., 949 P.2d 530, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997); State Bd. ofRegistration for the Healing Arts v. Fallon, No. SC 82841, 2001 WL
348980 (Mo. Apr. 10, 2001) (holding that ERISA does not preempt state law regulating
the medical profession and physician's medical necessity decision is subject to oversight
by the Board); see also discussion infra notes 271-80 and accompanying text.
260. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526,534-35 (5th
Cir. 2000).
261. State law redress would be limited to licensure and discipline under the state
medical practice act. It would not provide a remedy to individual patients who suffer
harm as a result of a medical necessity decision.
262. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
263. Not every coverage decision made by a physician-manager involves clinical
judgment. For example, a physician-manager might interpret the terms of the managed
care contract to determine whether a prescribed treatment is covered. In addition, a
physician-manager will make not every clinically based coverage decision. Managed
care organizations frequently delegate the responsibility for utilization management to
incentivized physicians when they bear the financial risk for treatment they do not
provide.
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for its treatment. ' ' 264 The Court then acknowledged a newly created category
consisting of "mixed eligibility and treatment decisions" intended to determine
the "when-and-how" of coverage and treatment.265 The Court analogized these
mixed decisions to "the sorts of decisions made by licensed medical practitioners
millions of time every day."'26 Pegram, however, held only that mixed
eligibility/treatment decisions do not implicate fiduciary duties under ERISA.
The opinion leaves for another day the question whether state law challenges to
mixed eligibility/treatment determinations will be treated different from pure
eligibility determinations for purposes of ERISA preemption.267 If mixed
eligibility/treatment decisions are analogized to treatment decisions, rather than
benefit determinations, they may be subject to state malpractice law, an area of
"traditional state regulation" in health care.
The result that physician-managers will be subject to state law when they
are exercising medical judgment in ways that affect the treatment of individual
patients is intuitively appealing. Nonetheless, the prospect of holding physicianmanagers answerable to their professional peers presents starkly some of the risks
of self-regulation. Those risks became reality in the single reported case in
which a state board of medicine exercised jurisdiction of a physician-manager.
C. A Case Study in the Perilsof ProfessionalSelf-Regulation
The principal criticisms of professional self-regulation center on the
discrepancy between its promise and its performance. Proponents of selfregulation point to its ability to form and communicate values, to reflect current
knowledge, and to foster voluntary compliance. Opponents of professional selfregulation argue that the values it introduces may represent a narrow or parochial
view of the community the profession is designed to serve: in this context
limiting its view to the individual and failing to embrace obligations to the
community. Furthermore, critics maintain that professional standards are too
often a guise for self-protection and that enforcement of standards aimed at
patient protection is lax.268 As the case discussed below reveals, subjecting

264. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228. The Court distinguished "treatment decisions"
made by physicians to determine the "appropriate medical response" in the light of a
patient's "constellation of symptoms." Id.
265. Id. at 229.
266. Id. at 232.
267. Some commentators read Pegram as clearly opening the door for state law
challenges to mixed eligibility/treatment determinations. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche,
U.S.Health CareAfter Pegram: Betrayal at the Bedside?, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 224, 227
(2000).
268. See, e.g., Stanley J. Gross, Professional Licensure and Quality: The
Evidence, Policy Analysis No. 79 (Dec. 9, 1986), availableat http://www.cato.org/pubsl
pas/pa079.html (discussing evidence of shortcomings of licensure and peer review in

protecting the public from incompetent practitioners).
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physicians who are engaged in disfavored activities to the oversight of their peers
also creates the possibility of selective enforcement, bias, and double standards.
On December 28, 1992, Dr. John Murphy, the medical director of Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Arizona ("BCBSA"), was asked to pre-authorize payment
for a laparoscopic cholecystectomy (surgery to remove the gallbladder)," 9 The
patient, identified only as "S.B.", was a forty-six-year-old woman who received
health care coverage through BCBSA. Surgery had been recommended by her
treating physician, Dr. Richard Jonas, and the consultant surgeon, Dr. David
Johnson, to whom Dr. Jonas had referred S.B. On December 29, Dr. Murphy
refused to pre-authorize payment for the recommended surgery on the ground
that it was not medically necessary. He based his decision on his interpretation
of the findings of an ultrasound study, which did not reveal the presence of
gallstones, other clinical test results, and on the patient's past history of similar
complaints. He also spoke with the patient's treating physicians. Dr. Murphy
attributed S.B.'s condition to "irritable colon syndrome," a condition that does
not call for removal of the gallbladder.27
This was not a case of a physician-manager who lacked training or
experience. Dr. Murphy appeared to be qualified to make a medical necessity
decision concerning a patient with S.B.'s symptoms. He was employed and
licensed as a physician in Arizona, the patient's home state; he, therefore,
possessed the minimum indicia of competency required by the State of Arizona
to practice medicine.7 1 Moreover, he was a gastroenterologist, the kind of subspecialist who routinely treated problems like S.B.'s.2 Before making his
decision, he consulted with the physician who had recommended and would be
performing the surgery. Accordingly, Dr. Murphy possessed the same
qualifications that would have been required for him to treat the patient, although
his training would not extend to performing the surgery. Reflecting traditional
medical values in making his decision about the surgical procedure, he consulted
with a physician with appropriate training and expertisePm

269. See Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs of Ariz., 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997).
270. Id. at 533.

271. Because managed care organizations take the position that utilizationmanagement decisions are not the practice of medicine, physician-employees are
generally not required to be licensed in the state where the patient-enrollee resides. A
physician located in Connecticut, for example, might make a medical necessity decision
about the care of a patient residing in New Mexico.
272. Private accrediting agencies recommend that physician-reviewers be in the
same or similar specialty that typically treats the condition at issue. National Committee
for Quality Assurance, Standards for Accreditation of Managed Care Organizations,
Standard UM 3.3 (1999) ("managed care organization has procedures for using boardcertified physicians from appropriate specialty areas to assist in making determinations
of medical appropriateness").
273. Contrast the facts of this case with those of Pappasv. Asbel, 724 A.2d S89
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Despite Dr. Murphy's decision not to pre-authorize payment for the
surgery, the patient decided to undergo the surgery. The post-operative
pathology reports revealed that the surgery was warranted by the patient's
medical condition. Based on the surgical reports, BCBSA paid for the surgery,
despite its previous decision not to pre-authorize payment. As a result of her
decision to proceed with the surgery despite the medical necessity decision and
BCBSA's subsequent payment decision, S.B. suffered no medical or financial
harm from Dr. Murphy's original, and seemingly erroneous, medical necessity
decision.274
Dr. Johnson, nonetheless, reported Dr. Murphy to the Arizona Board of
Medical Examiners for medical incompetence and unprofessional conduct. Dr.
Johnson contended that Dr. Murphy's medical necessity decision caused S.B. to
question Dr. Johnson's judgment, and, thereby, interfered with and compromised
his relationship with the patient and "required the patient to 'gamble' with her

own money."27' In its discussion of the charge against Dr. Murphy, members of

the state medical board characterized the case as "the most important case in our
book" and suggested that the board should "do it up big" and "invite the
press."276 The state board eventually issued an "advisory letter of concern," a
mild non-disciplinary action that did not affect Dr. Murphy's license or good
standing.2' The board justified the sanction on the ground that Dr. Murphy had
made an "inappropriate medical decision which [sic] could have caused harm to
a patient."278

(Pa. 1998), vacatedsubnom. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530
U.S. 1241 (2000), remand to Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001). See discussion
supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. There, a physician-manager trained in
pediatrics made a decision about the treatment of an adult patient with a neurological
problem without consulting with the attending physicians.
274. The lack of harm to the patient would preclude a finding of medical
malpractice, even if the erroneous medical necessity decision did rise to the level of
medical negligence. A showing of harm, however, is not required for disciplinary action
against a physician.
275. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4 & Ex. C, Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs of
Ariz., 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (Nos. CA-CV 95-0327, CA-CV 96-0182
(consolidated)) (on file with author).
276. Id. at 6 (excerpts from a transcript of the board meeting).
277. Under Arizona law, a "letter of concern" is defined as:
[A]n advisory letter to notify a physician that, while there is insufficient
evidence to support disciplinary action, the board believes the physician
should modify or eliminate certain practices and that the continuation of the
activities which led to the information being submitted to the board may result
in action against the physician's license.
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 32-1401(14) (1997).
278. Dr. Murphy and BCBSA appealed the decision on the ground that the board
of medical examiners lacked jurisdiction to review physician-managers' medical
decisions. The trial court and the court of appeals agreed that the board of medical
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This case highlights many of the problems with professional self-regulation
as practiced, some more apparent than others. Note first how the case came to
the attention of the state board of medicine; another physician reported Dr.
Murphy. State boards of medicine rarely have sufficient funding to support an
ongoing policing function.279 Therefore, they rely on reporting by third parties,
usually patients, payers, or other physicians. Conventional wisdom is that
physicians are reluctant to report their peers. Here, the opposite occurred. Dr.
Johnson reported Dr. Murphy although Dr. Murphy possessed appropriate
qualifications, followed customary procedures, and no harm came to the patient
as a result of his decision. If underreporting characterizes self-regulation
generally, this case suggests that that reluctance will dissipate when the subject
of disciplinary action is engaged in disfavored activities'
Selective reporting in this case was followed by selective and seemingly
biased enforcement. The standards used to evaluate Dr. Murphy's conduct were
unclear;, he was charged with unprofessional conduct and medical incompetence.
The only conduct evinced by Dr. Murphy was his disagreement with the treating

examiners had jurisdiction to review Dr. Murphy's medical necessity decision,
characterizing it as a "medical decision." Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs of Ariz., 949
P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
279. See AMERINGER, supra note 39, at 69-71 (noting the traditional problems with
funding and improved funding in recent years).

280. Patients might fail to detect physician misconduct, because they lack the
technical expertise. Patients who are harmed by a decision not to recommend a course
of treatment, for example, may not realize that a cost-based clinical decision was made.
Furthermore, patients are unlikely to report problems where physician conduct aided
them at the expense of others, including decisions to over-treat or to make misstatements
in order to obtain reimbursement. Even if patients were to detect misconduct, they lack
incentives to report physicians to state boards of medicine, because state boards cannot
provide compensation for harm. To the extent that disciplinary authorities rely on patient
reporting, then, the self-regulatory system suffers from the same shortcomings as the
market: uninformed consumers who cannot predict what services should have been
provided or evaluate the quality of the services actually rendered.
281. Payers might be more inclined to report physician misconduct than patients.
They are also more likely to detect misconduct as a result of their ability to collect and
analyze data across large numbers of physicians and patients. It is possible, however,
that managed care organizations, which contract with physicians to provide services to
their enrollees, might prefer to simply terminate or not renew the physician's contract,
rather than undergo the time and expense of a board proceeding. Even if payers elect to
report, professional boards are likely to be hostile to managed care organizations and are
unlikely to respond to their complaints, especially when those complaints allege overtreatment of patients.
282. From the beginnings of a prepaid health care system, organized medicine
resisted the evolution of new delivery models. Early participants found themselves
ousted from local medical societies and disciplined by local medical boards. Barbara

Allan Shickich, Legal Characteristicsof the Health Maintenance Organization, in
HEALTHCARE FACILrriES LAw

1056-58 (Ann M. Dellinger ed., 1990).
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physicians. But disagreement among physicians about the proper course of
medical treatment is common, although it typically occurs in the course of the
much-encouraged professional consultation." 3 The only evidence of medical
incompetence before the board was a single instance of an error in medical
judgment.2 84 Disciplinary action is rarely based on a single medical error of
judgment. It is unlikely, therefore, that the board would have taken any action
against a treating physician who had erroneously decided that surgery was not
required. 5 The differential treatment suggests that either existing standards for
discipline of practicing physicians are too low, or that the inexact nature of
existing standards lend themselves to manipulation based on favor or disfavor.
The mild sanction imposed by the board suggests that if the case were, as the
board contended, the "most important" among those under its consideration, that
importance arose from something other than the seriousness of the error. The
conclusion that Murphy was one of selective and biased enforcement intended
to chill unpopular market innovation by enforcement actions against the
physicians who participate in that activity is difficult to avoid.
This case indicates that professional self-regulation is another in a series of
flawed alternatives to address intractable problems in health care. It, like market
mechanisms and command-and-control legislation, has its shortcomings, and also
like them, it has its benefits. Those that reject self-regulation altogether on the
basis of its imperfections, are engaged in a type of wishful utopian thinking,
searching for a perfect regulatory alternative that is always just beyond reach and
ignoring a present-day opportunity to address existing problems.

283. See Roberts, supra note 228, at C12 (describing medical practice at Mayo
Clinic noting that "the battle against cancer begins with an argument" among physicians
about appropriate treatment).

284. See Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs of Ariz., 949 P.2d 530, 533 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1997). The board's request for documents from BCBSA concerning twenty cases
in which Dr. Murphy denied pre-certification for payment were not produced. Id.
285. Lax enforcement is a common criticism of self-regulation. Commentators
have estimated that five to fifteen percent of practicing physicians lack competence. See
Ross D. Silverman, Book Review Essay, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 143, 144 & n.2 (2000)
(reviewing AMERINGER, supra note 39). Yet, disciplinary actions are taken against
substantially fewer physicians. In 1998, the Federation of State Medical Boards data
bank reported a total of 4,520 disciplinary actions against 673,781 physicians practicing
in the United States, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Federation of State
Medical Boards, FSMB Facts, availableat http://www.fsmb.org (last visited July 28,
2000). Although the Federation contends that these data present an incomplete picture

of the performance of the states' regulatory systems, little else is available.
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Society has signaled a legitimate need for physician cooperation with and
participation in health care spending control.2 6 Although physicians cannot
decide for society how much of its resources to spend on health care or which
medical uses are more deserving of resources, society cannot begin to allocate
health care resources without the profession's recognition of its professional
responsibility as a steward for society's funds.2 In current practice, treating
physicians and physician-managers facilitate the allocation of health care
resources by making cost-conscious clinical decisions about individual patients.
Because of the medical and technological advances that the medical profession
has achieved, health care spending control will be inevitable regardless of the
present-day or future mechanisms devised to deliver and finance health care
services. Health care spending controls will require physician cooperation. And,
meaningful physician participation will be facilitated by a self-regulatory system
and professional norms that require physician cooperation with social goals to
control health care spending.
Those who have examined self-regulation in the past have expressed
justifiable disappointment with the results.
The power to self regulate was
conferred by the state on the medical profession in exchange for its commitment
to select its members well, ensure their clinical competence, and serve the public
interest." The current regulatory framework has failed to provide guidance and
direction to physicians to address the complexities of a managed care system of
delivery or the societal need to control health care spending.2 Its standards have
not been re-examined in light of changes in physicians' roles in the medical
marketplace. Moreover, it has failed to address those circumstances in which
self-interest and ethics are at greatest divergence and the power of self-interest
most powerful, where behavior is most likely to fall short of ethical ideals and
the authority to direct with specificity and to sanction might be most usefully
employed.

286. See David B. Wilkins, Redefining the "Professional"in ProfessionalEthics:
An InterdisciplinaryApproach to Teaching Professionalism, 58 LAW & CoNr-TM-P.
PROBS. 241, 249 (1995) (noting that professional ethics must be designed to serve
specific societal needs).
287. See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health CareMorally, 82 CAL L. REV. 1449,
1542-43 (1994) (arguing that allocation of health care resources among possible uses
requires moral judgment).
288. See supra note 11; see also Frank Welsh, Self-Regulation: The TrueKey to
Success of Physician-DirectedNetworks, 23 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 1, 3 (1996) (noting
disappointing results of studies from the 1980s and more favorable results from recent
physician-led efforts to influence clinical behavior).
289. See AMERINGER, supranote 39, at 25-38.
290. See discussion supra notes 84-93.
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To serve the public interest, the medical profession must develop an
aspirational alternative to patient primacy, reconceptualize a professional duty
to a population of patients, acknowledge conflict within the physician's duty to
the patient and the public, and create professional standards to balance
conflicting aspects of professional duty. Professional esteem must be awarded
for advancing knowledge about and providing cost-effective care based on a
myriad of minor clinical decisions much as professional status is currently
reserved for the treatment of patients who have rare diseases or who have failed
to respond to traditional therapies. Until the professional duty is expanded to
include the group while serving the individual, the profession cannot begin the
difficult work of laying ground rules for integrating population-based needs with
individual concerns and of training medical students and physicians to carry out
these new obligations. These shifts in professional duties and values will require
a shift in the social norms of professional conduct, not merely changes in
economic incentives.
Social norms reflect societal conditions existing at the time of their
formation. Professor Einer Elhauge observed that the professional paradigm,
with its emphasis on patient primacy, worked well as long as medical benefits
exceeded the cost of providing care.291 Advances in medical technology and
pharmacology made it possible to provide increasingly smaller marginal medical
benefit in exchange for disproportionately higher costs. The patient-primacy
directive became unsustainable in light of the changed conditions. Deviations
from the patient-primacy directive have occurred in the past, and, therefore,
modification is possible in the context of cost control. Despite the rhetoric of the
overriding commitment to patient primacy, physicians have recognized trade-offs
required by the need to protect the public health. For example, under a public
health paradigm, physicians have restricted their prescriptions of antibiotics to
address the threat of drug-resistant strains of bacteria. They also have embraced
universal immunization against contagious diseases beyond the rate required to
create herd immunity, despite that immunizations pose known and inherent risks
that will materialize for some patients. To date, however, the medical profession
has resisted undertaking a duty to society at large to marshal its health care
resources.
Society's need to control health care spending presents a classic collective
action problem.292 Society is concerned about health care spending not because
it wishes to restrict an individual's spending of her disposable income on health
care services. Rather, health care spending control is motivated principally by
the desire to control the cost of health care coverage. No single clinical decision
291. See Elhauge, supra note 287, at 1458.
292. Social norm scholars have used norm theory to explain the resolution of
collective action problems, which occur when individuals can benefit from a common
good without contributing to its existence. For example, institutional economist Elinor
Ostrom has discussed the use of norms to conserve community resources such as water.
See Rai, supra note 254, at 83 & n.33 (discussing Ostrom's work).
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between a patient and a physician will have a measurable effect on overall health
care spending by third-party payers or, therefore, on health care premiums.
Accordingly, each individual patient can benefit from lower premiums for health
care coverage if health care spending is controlled, without personally
participating in resource allocation decisions to consume fewer health care
services. If professional norms could be influenced to discourage the overprescription and resulting over-consumption of health care resources that might
otherwise result from self-interested decisions about use of health care services,
overall spending could be affected. 93
Although social norms can be used to resolve collective action problems, in
this case professional norms have not achieved that result. To consider how to
intervene to influence professional norms to respond to changed social
conditions, it would be useful to find an explanation for this lack of response.
Social norm theorists posit that the failure of norms to respond to changed
conditions can be explained by two factors, inertia or affirmative resistance.
Professor Dennis Chong has observed that inertia inhibits norm change by
preventing actors from recognizing changed conditions.' If inertia is the cause
of the lack of norm change in response to changed conditions, providing
information about changed conditions should facilitate change. Inertia, however,
cannot explain the failure of professional norms to evolve in response to
heightened cost consciousness. The market changes are profound and their direct
effects on physicians are impossible to ignore. Furthermore, medical norms have
evolved modestly to develop standards that permit cost considerations, indicating
awareness of changed conditions. But, organized medicine and many physicians
have rejected resource allocation as a task of medicine and the methods used by
managed care organizations to encourage physician allocation. Thus, resistance
to the corporatization of health care and fear of loss of professional power is the
more likely explanation for the failure of norm evolution.
Because policymakers and scholars discount the utility of self-regulation as
a means to overcome that resistance, efforts to initiate and influence norm change
in medicine have been sporadic." s Nonetheless, existing conditions indicate that
norm change is theoretically possible. When norms are at odds with societal

293. Professional self-regulation dictates that physicians' clinical decisions have
a scientific basis for assessing the care that is beneficial to the patient's health and that
which is harmful or useless, and a professional commitment to provide only the former.
See Elhauge, supranote 287, at 1542-43 (noting this benefit of the professional paradigm
for allocating health care resources). If self-regulation is to facilitate cost control, that
ethical dictate will have to be expanded to consider care that provides low benefit in
comparison to its cost.
294. See Chong, supranote 214, at 2084.
295. Scholars just have begun to focus on the methods by which norms can be
changed. See Lessig, The New Chicago School,supranote 197, at 666 (stating that norm
change is the focus of the "New Chicago School").
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conditions, cognitive dissonance results.' The contradiction that exists between
market demands and professional standards already has been identified. This
disparity between existing professional norms and societal conditions could lead
to a change in norms as actors attempt to eliminate factors that cause cognitive
dissonance.
The evidence of norm change initiated within the profession is sparse.
Professional standards have evolved to acknowledge the legitimacy of cost
considerations in clinical decisions. There is also some evidence of changes in
practice patterns as a result of increased managed care market presence and
progress in the identification of clinical best practices through outcomes research.
Institutional peer review has taken on economic as well as clinical aspects.297
Moreover, despite the lack of significant change in medical norms toward
undertaking a primary role in resource allocation, there is evidence that a
dialogue has been initiated within the medical profession. Physicians are
discussing whether to recommit to the patient-primacy directive or to adopt new
ethical standards to manage health care resources for the collective benefit.298
New professional standards are being proposed for reflection and informal
consideration. 2'
Norm change can occur based on purely voluntary efforts. Group-initiated
voluntary norm change is most likely to succeed with the involvement of
individuals or groups who are trusted by the profession. Thus, managed care
organizations are unlikely to influence norm change within the profession; nor
is lay influence likely to facilitate change. An individual professional with
persuasive insights might initiate voluntary efforts.3" Effective norm change,
however, ultimately will require collective action, because norms evolve through
mutual agreement, acceptance, and internalization. Those who would effect a
change in professional norms must find a means to support voluntary efforts by
296. See Sunstein, supranote 197, at 2049.
297. See John D. Blum, The Evolution ofPhysician Credentialinginto Managed
Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173, 179-81 (1996) (discussing
economic factors in hospitals' credentialing of physicians).
298. See, e.g., John Halvorsen, ProfessionalismReconsidered: Prioritiesfor
Physicians, 8 ARCH. FAM. MED. 173, 174-75 (1999); Herbert M. Swick, Toward a
Normative Definition of Medical Professionalism,75 ACAD. MED. 612 (2000); Vida
Foubister, Physicians Torn Between Two Loyalties, AM. MED. NEWS, May 15, 2000,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prscO515.htm (last

visited May 8, 2001) (reporting on discussions within the medical profession about the
conflict between individual patients and collective needs and questions about the effect

on medical ethics).
299. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Robert A. Berenson, The Ethics ofManaged Care:

A Dose ofRealism, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 290-93 (1997-98) (proposing new substantive
standards); David J. Rothman, Medical Professionalism-Focusingon the Real Issues,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1284, 1284-86 (2000).
300. Professor Sunstein classifies such individuals "norm entrepreneurs."
Sunstein, supranote 197, at 2034.
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those physicians who advocate a reexamination of professional standards and to
influence the outcome of those discussions. To date, however, reliance on
individual physician actors has proved uncertain.
The legal system and changes in law also can facilitate norm change.
Changes in legal standards for physician conduct might be used to enhance
voluntary efforts to facilitate professional norm change. The standards
established through professional self-regulatory mechanisms form the terms of
an implicit contract between medicine and the state'
If medicine has failed to
perform to the satisfaction of society or if the terms of the contract no longer
meet societal needs, the terms of that contract should be renegotiated. Because
the regulation of physicians traditionally has been an area of state concern, the
states might facilitate a renegotiation by a change in substantive law or by legal
statements that express or educate about social needs3 2 Reliance on law to
change professional norms also would facilitate broader social input into defining
the contours of professional ethical conduct. Because one of the criticisms of
professional self-regulation is its insularity, democratic process might inform, as
well as lend credence to, professional standards. Lav also carries with it an
expectation of compliance that could be a powerful signal of a change in
expectations." If some members of the profession are poised to acknowledge
that changed circumstances require changed ethics, law can empower them by
legitimizing a norm shift. Professor Lawrence Lessig calls this the process of
"ambiguation": using the law to blur the social meaning of a particular act?'
This blurring creates ambiguity about the motive for conduct that might be
viewed with suspicion and condemnation. Physicians and physician-managers
who began to consider the needs of the collective in the treatment of the
individual could be viewed as simply complying with the demands of law, rather
than consciously breaking ranks with a powerful social norm of their profession.
The existence of the law can serve as a kind of permission to norm entrepreneurs
who would change highly valued but dysfunctional social norms.
To date, however, the law too has failed. The signals it has sent to the
medical community and the population-at-large have been contradictory; market
constraints on physician conduct have been encouraged and authorized but legal
standards to which physicians are held have not evolved)ls That government has

301. See Robert Dingwall & Paul Fenn, A 'RespectableProfession'? Sociological
andEconomicPerspectiveson the Regulation ofProfessionalServices, 7 INTf'L REV. L.

&ECON. 51, 62 (1987) (viewing a professional code of conduct as the "outcome of an
implicit bargain between the state and the group" and suggesting that the terms of this
bargain are important and subject to renegotiation).
302. If the profession values the right to engage in self-regulation, the desire to
retain that right should serve as a powerful motivator to participate meaningfully in the
process or renegotiation.
303. Sunstein, supra note 197, at 2028-30.
304. See Lessig, supranote 197, at 1010-14.
305. See discussion supranotes 31-38.
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failed to act, however, does not mean that it cannot act to influence norms. An
initial question will involve the respective roles of the federal and state
governments. Federal action spurred the development of HMOs as a means to
control health care spending. Having authorized physician involvement in
controlling health care spending, the federal government might take the next step
to facilitate more active physician participation. Action by federal government
offers the benefit of uniformity; consolidation of the disparate voices in medicine
is an advantage of a centralized discussion initiated by the federal government.
The Institute of Medicine has started a national dialogue with its recent reports
on medical error. At the request of federal officials, it would play a similar role
with respect to physicians' roles in cost-control initiatives. Federal efforts to
initiate dialogue that could lead to norm change would be beneficial. Meaningful
oversight of bedside medical practices at the federal level, however, is unwieldy.
The states already have agencies in place that could facilitate discussion and
change in professional standards. Properly funded and staffed, these agencies
would have a greater ability to oversee and influence individual physician
conduct. A discussion at the state level has the familiar advantage of allowing
difficult issues to be vetted in the laboratory of the states as a means to determine
which of the disparage approaches yield the most efficient outcome. The
Federation of State Medical Boards could serve as a clearinghouse for sharing
information generated by state boards of medicine.
Giving the responsibility to change professional standards to reflect
contemporary needs to a body with a public charge and local enforcement offers
the prospect of some political and public accountability. Legislative
pronouncements that state boards of medicine should adopt cost-conscious
clinical decisions could open a mandatory dialogue at the state level about a
change in ethical norms and initiate the process of developing nuanced rules to
make the trade-off between individual patient and populations of patients. This
would offer the benefits of rendering medical rationing explicit and allowing all
stakeholders to participate in the discussion and have input into the decisionmaking process. The dialogue must include members of the medical profession,
because norm change is most likely to be affected by those respected within the
social group. Legitimacy of the standards will be an important factor in
compliance. States individually or collectively should seek to involve
representatives from a broad spectrum of the profession, including physicians in
traditional roles and physician-managers and other physician executives.'
Because of the importance of physician ethical conduct to society, broader
societal input into defining what ethical conduct entails would be beneficial. 7
306. Antitrust laws have served this purpose in the past. See, e.g., AMA v. FTC,
638 F.2d 443 (1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 676, reh "gdenied, 456 U.S. 966 (1982) (ban on
physician advertising struck down as a violation of the federal antitrust laws). Tort law
should continue to provide a floor to ensure that cost-control measures do not initiate a
race to the bottom.
307. See Brian C. Kalt, Death, Ethics, and the State, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
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The trade associations that represent the views of organized medicine have a
place at the table, but should not be permitted to dominate the conversation.
States will have to guard against the influence of self-interest that does not
serve public needs. With vigilance, existing legal regimes can be used to
dissuade self-protective conduct.L3 In addition, more legislative attention to the
standards and procedures employed by state boards of medicine will be required
if the boards are charged with implementing new professional standards.
Substantive and procedural safeguards will be necessary to ensure that this public
agency acts in the public interest.
This is not the place to propose new substantive professional norms; that
norm evolution must begin with members of the profession?' 9 My aim is simply
to urge a reexamination of discarded solutions. The need for social norms to
temper professional behavior in a medical marketplace will not go away, and the
confrontation between social reality and idealistic myth is inevitable. In a
different time, the medical professions' autonomous self-regulation formed the
professional norms that led to improved scientific knowledge and methods of
diagnosis and treatment of disease. In the cost-constrained environment that
resulted, the profession's failure to reconcile professional standards and
economic reality has impeded the improvement of social response. The task for
the law and public policy is to intervene to ensure that professional selfregulation serves public needs.

487, 514-15 (2000) (making a similar point in the context of decisions about patients'
rights to terminate or refuse medical treatment).
308. The AMA has formed an Institute of Ethics to bring physician and lay experts
together to consider contemporary ethical issues. In the interest of disclosure, I currently
serve on the Expert Advisory Panel on the ethical implications of benefit determinations.
309. For one prominent scholar's initial efforts to define new standards, see David
Mechanic, ManagedCare and the hnperativefor a New ProfessionalEthic, 19 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 100 (2000) (discussing advocacy, population health, and evidence-based
medicine).
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